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Chapter 1: Introduction 
While the Trump presidency has been marked by one media storm after the next, one of 
the most potent controversies occurred in July, 2019, when President Trump suggested in a tweet 
that Democratic congresswomen Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Rashida Talib, Ilhan Omar, and 
Ayanna Pressley should “go back” to their own countries and fix those problems before applying 
their brand of politics to the United States. That three of the four liberal congresswomen (now 
referred to as “the squad”) were born in the United States and all are American citizens drew 
intense anger from the left, including numerous charges of racism against Trump. The president 
doubled down in response by criticizing Democrats’ support for these congresswomen due to 
their far left brand of politics compared to the rest of their party. He tweeted that this support 
“means they are endorsing Socialism, hate of Israel and the USA!” (Davis 2019).  
Given the unpredictability of Trump’s Twitter activity, the accusation of socialism does 
not come as much surprise. Whether or not this tweet (or any of the president’s tweets) was 
grounded in reality, a claim that an elected politician hates America has severe implications on 
our political system. Disagreements with the opposing political party would be expected across 
the aisle; accusations of them lacking patriotism would not. Though Republicans and Democrats 
might have different ideas about key policy issues, it’s dubious that any elected official would 
run for office and enter a life of public service because of their hatred of the United States.  
Three years earlier, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton drew ire from the right 
during a controversial campaign speech. In her remarks, she referred to a group of then candidate 
Donald Trump’s supporters as belonging to the “basket of deplorables,” which she claimed 
consisted of people who were drawn to Trump’s rhetoric by their “racist, sexist, homophobic, 
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xenophobic, Islamophobic” beliefs. Just as with the prior example, it seems dubious to suggest 
that this substantial group of voters actually display such hatred to warrant this name-calling. 
Even if this portion of Trump supporters did hold such beliefs, it would seem that these 
accusations could be fundamentally incompatible with any candidate’s desire to represent the 
entire American population.  
The hatred and tension from this situation exemplify the current polarized state of 
American politics. Polarization refers to a deep division between two groups, sets of opinions, or 
beliefs. However, this definition addresses the general ideological division between Democrats 
and Republicans. These disagreements today may spill over into other aspects of our political 
and social lives, constituting a different kind of polarization called “affective polarization.”  
Iyengar and Westwood (2015) define affective polarization as “the tendency of people 
identifying as Republicans or Democrats to view opposing partisans negatively and co-partisans 
positively” (691). They highlight that biases of affective polarization can impact normally 
nonpartisan behavior. For instance, a Republican voter may be inclined not to hire a job 
candidate who is involved with their school’s Young Democrats chapter, or vice versa (Iyengar 
and Westwood 2015). Indicating a partisan preference, even in this nonpolitical setting, can 
dissuade one from hiring or associating with another who supports the opposing party if they are 
motivated by affective polarization. Such behavior further sorts the American public into groups, 
bringing us closer to people we agree with and further from those we disagree with.  
As a result of the social sorting described by Iyengar and Westwood (2015), our reactions 
to political messages have become more intense and emotional within these groups (Mason 
2016). Some argue that this phenomenon exists because the strongest supporters of the 
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Democratic and Republican parties are moving farther to the left and right, respectively (Webster 
and Abramowitz 2017). Others suggest that divergences in policy preferences are actually 
minimal among voters and that affective polarization is driven by our elected representatives 
(Fiorina 2009).  
Issue preferences only tell part of the story, however. Mason (2016) echoes much recent 
research in political science, noting that while it’s difficult to conclude exactly how divided the 
electorate is on certain issues, analyses of issue positions fail to capture the emotional aspect of 
partisan politics. Regardless of its sources, affective polarization has likely hindered 
opportunities for Americans to find common ground or even have discussions about important 
issues. The existence of strong negative emotions toward “the other side” have flooded American 
politics: Americans are now less likely than at any time in recent history to want to have political 
discussions with people who disagree with them (Pew Research Center 2014). 
These attitudes do not just come from purely political contexts. We see affective 
polarization when a generally apolitical situation becomes politicized. Perhaps the best example 
of this comes from the most recent season of HBO’s ​Curb Your Enthusiasm​. In the Season 10 
premiere, “Happy New Year,” protagonist (and satirical anti-hero) Larry David decides to buy a 
“Make America Great Again” hat in an effort to repel people. Living in the predominantly liberal 
Los Angeles area, David uses the hat to ward people off from sitting next to him at a bar, to get 
out of a meeting with an unpleasant acquaintance, and to appease a motorcyclist whom he cuts 
off in traffic. As comical as these scenes are, they demonstrate a true phenomenon in American 
society: People seem increasingly unwilling to associate with those who hold opposing 
viewpoints. This is born out in at least some quantitative data: Over 60% of citizens are living in 
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politically homogeneous neighborhoods that handed the election to one side by over a 20% 
margin  (Wasserman 2017). 
My thesis is about these divides. Following the 2016 presidential election, I experienced 
my own intense affective polarization. While an anger at the result eventually subsided, I 
continued exhibiting some of the behavior described above. At a certain point, I began to wonder 
why these feelings were so intense and how common such resentment was. Those feelings and 
questions ultimately served as the inspiration for this project. My thesis sets out to investigate the 
prevalence of affective polarization and uncover its implications, particularly on college 
campuses. Regardless of one’s political beliefs, it seems wholly unproductive for Americans to 
dissociate or express such intense animosity towards the outgroup members. I will review 
literature and conduct quantitative and qualitative analysis to shed light on these topics. 
Chapter 2 will delve further into scholarly literature on affective polarization and its 
implications on American society. In this chapter, I will investigate how scholars argue affective 
polarization has impacted our political discourse. I will also review existing research on how 
affective polarization specifically shapes political conversations on college campuses and to 
what extent it has hindered such conversations on campuses. I hope to reveal the breadth of the 
impact of affective polarization throughout this section.  
Chapter 3 will introduce quantitative analysis. I plan to conduct analyses of several 
large-N, nationally representative surveys (including those conducted by the Foundation for 
Individual Rights in Education and the Bucknell Institute for Public Policy) that explore (a) the 
idea of affective polarization in the American public, and (b) the public’s perceptions of the 
climate for political discourse on college campuses. Are Americans really growing more angry at 
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those with whom they disagree, or less likely to have discussions with those who hold dissenting 
views? Who is most likely to feel this way? Do Americans think college campuses remain places 
for civil discourse and debate? Or do they think colleges have become echo chambers as well? 
Chapter 4 will focus on qualitative evidence of polarization on college campuses. In this 
section, I will investigate a variety of topics, including how prevalent perceptions of political 
beliefs on campus lead to de facto self-censorship, and how much of this stems from affective 
polarization. In other words, I want to examine if students who refrain from voicing their 
political opinions do so because of fear of negative consequences of expressing an opposing 
viewpoint, or simply due to general apathy or a desire to stay away from controversial topics. 
This chapter will also analyze how media coverage on both ends of the political spectrum have 
influenced affective polarization. Moreover, this section will attempt to determine whether 
attitudes about political discourse stem from the current political climate or have existed long 











Chapter 2: Literature Review on Affective Polarization 
Section 2.1 Overview 
In this chapter, I will review existing literature on affective polarization as well as 
extreme partisanship in the United States. This will begin with a general analysis of how these 
phenomena have increased over the past half century and have become even more prevalent in 
recent years. I will then discuss the effects of increased affective polarization in terms of both 
political and social interactions. Subsequently, I will highlight a number of advanced 
implications of affective polarization on American society and political discourse, including its 
impact on college campuses. 
While polarization maintains a constant presence in contemporary political discourse, it’s 
important to first put in perspective the effect that it has on our attitudes. According to the 
American National Election Study (ANES), citizens’ support and approval of their own political 
party has remained relatively constant over the past 40 years. At the same time, the animosity 
Americans feel towards the other political party has increased significantly. These sentiments are 
measured as a “temperature,” indicating how positively or negatively citizens feel towards a 
party, ranging from 100 degrees (most positive) to 0 degrees (most negative). In 1978, ANES 
data shows a difference of roughly 23 degrees between feelings towards one’s own party and 
positive feelings towards the opposite party. By 2016, this gap widened to about 41 degrees 
(Iyengar et al. 2019). In keeping with this temperature metaphor, it seems that a sort of 
ideological climate change has taken place. Whereas we once felt only a marginal difference (or 
decline in temperature) between our own party and the opposing one, we now view the out-group 
as a brutally cold winter day when compared to a pleasant spring day.  
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What has caused this significant change in the partisan climate? One such reason is 
ideological realignment, the majority of which took place during the latter half of the 20th 
century. From the 1970s to the 1990s, citizens’ party allegiance shifted from the party that their 
parents supported to the party that aligned with their policy preferences (Abramowitz and 
Sanders 1998). For instance, Abramowitz and Sanders note that Republican gains “have been 
greatest among members of groups with conservative policy preferences, such as white males 
and white southerners” (1998, 648). As a result, citizens today exhibit more loyalty to their own 
party through straight-ticket voting. Moreover, elections for Senate, the House of 
Representatives, and even state government have gained increasing national attention as negative 
partisanship drives citizens to want to prevent the out-group from gaining political power 
(Abramowitz and Webster 2016).  
This affective nature of polarization extends well beyond electoral politics to generally 
nonpartisan behavior. For example, a Democratic voter may be inclined not to hire a job 
candidate who is involved with their school’s Young Republicans chapter, or vice versa (Iyengar 
and Westwood 2015). According to Iyengar and Westwood’s (2015) study, partisanship had a 
more demonstrable effect on respondents’ hiring choices than race. Furthermore, they find that 
such affective polarization seems to have a relatively equal effect from both sides of the aisle.  
Ultimately, extreme partisanship is shown to reach into a number of our social and economic 
activities (see Engelhardt and Utych 2018; McConnell et al. 2018).  1
In political debates, affective polarization has narrowed the path for common ground on 
key issues. Disdain of the opposite party inspires some citizens to prefer their representatives not 
1 I will revisit these examples in greater detail in Section 2. 
9 
to engage with that party’s proposals at all, rather than potentially agreeable points to a solution. 
In fact, Wolf et al. (2012) suggest that “partisan beliefs are coupled with a commitment to 
political strategies that undercut the ability to negotiate political compromise” (1689). Such 
behavior is often utilized by our elected officials on the national stage. For instance, we can use 
this lense to analyze Republicans’ refusal to consider President Obama’s nomination of Merrick 
Garland to the Supreme Court or Democrats’ vehement opposition to President Trump’s 
immigration policies. Garland was highly qualified to serve as a Supreme Court Justice and 
Trump’s border wall would barely register a fraction in the national budget. These displays of 
partisanship are not signs of how far apart the parties are on issues, but how much they are 
affectively polarized. In each case, we see hostility between Democrats and Republicans as the 
catalyst for their behavior instead of actual issue positions. Such strategies clearly play well to 
already polarized citizens of one side or the other, but a lack of willingness to compromise can 
have severe implications for the policy making process and inhibit important political debates. 
 
Section 2.2 Analyzing Polarization 
Though some contend that polarization does not have a deep impact on American society 
and only impacts elites or activists (e.g. Fiorina 2017), Abramowitz and Saunders (2006) 
demonstrate that the ideological distance between parties has nearly doubled since the 1970s. In 
addition, they suggest that most informed and politically active citizens are polarized while those 
who are not as informed tend to “cluste[r] near the center of the ideological spectrum” (554). 
Similar research shows that a plurality of citizens identify themselves as strong partisans, thus 
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indicating that American politics does not necessarily force a mass of ideological moderates to 
choose between extremes (Wolf et al. 2012).  
Prior to the ideological realignment of political parties, the American Political Science 
Association (APSA) took a stance in their 1950 report, “Towards a More Responsible Two-Party 
System,” that now reads rather ironically given the problems that polarization has since caused in 
our political discourse and policy making. In the report, APSA proposes to “keep the parties 
apart” by creating more cohesive platforms (1). Moreover, they argue the need for “organized 
party opposition” as well as party loyalty to their respective platforms (2).  Since the publication 
of the report, party policies have become more salient and identifiable for citizens (Hetherington 
2002), yet while APSA does govern the field of political science, they do not determine what 
actually happens in the realm of politics.  Nevertheless, this report has reentered public 2
conversation as critics lament the polarizing nature of the current political climate 
(Wickham-Jones 2018).  
The authors of the APSA report would be pleased to see the strong identities of today’s 
major parties, but they might not view the side effects of gridlock and lack of compromise as a 
realization of their proposals. This polarization can have an especially negative effect on 
Independent voters, who show less interest and trust in the political process once polarization is 
identified as a salient issue. Research suggests that when polarization is framed as a hindrance to 
effective policy making, citizens are more likely to support bipartisanship and listen to 
arguments from the opposing party (Robinson and Mullinix 2016). However, it’s clear from the 
words and actions of politicians from both sides that salience does not dissuade them from a fiery 
2 Among other proposed changes that have not come to fruition, the 1950 APSA report also suggested 
revisions to the electoral college and a completely unified party platform (Wickham-Jones 2018).  
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refusal to cooperate with the other’s legislative agenda. Multiple examples come from just prior 
to the 2010 midterm elections, when House Minority Leader John Boehner claimed that 
Republicans would do “everything” to “kill,” “stop,” or “slow down” President Obama’s 
legislative agenda. At the same time, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell stated that his 
party’s goal was to make Obama a “one-term president” (Barr 2010). Democrats in Washington 
are guilty of similar offenses, to the point where compromise and bipartisan legislation is often 
portrayed as “rare” (e.g. Armour 2019).  
How did American politics get to this point? In part, this came from the ideological 
sorting of political parties over the past half century. The Democratic Party used to consist of 
both Northern liberals and Southern conservatives remaining from the New Deal coalition, while 
the Republican Party also played home to a mix of ideologies. Starting in the 1970’s, Republican 
leaders worked to reshape the party under a strictly conservative ideology, recruiting Southern 
Democrats and purging more moderate members. These developments created more 
ideologically homogeneous parties heading into the 21st century, with the Republicans adhering 
to conservatism and Democrats trending towards liberalism (Rosenfeld 2017). Likewise, 
geographic areas are becoming more ideologically homogeneous and have fostered divides 
throughout the country, particularly as the Northeast and West votes increasingly Democratic 
and the South and Interior West votes primarily Republican (Hopkins 2018). In addition to these 
changes, technological advances have proliferated the number of partisan or ideologically slanted 
news sources. Whereas Americans previously could have trusted Walter Cronkite to report the 
truth, now the electorate can turn to conservative-leaning outlets like FoxNews or liberal-leaning 
ones like MSNBC to hear news more favorable to their own party. Slanted news sources might 
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not have as strong of an impact on ideological moderates, but they appear to pull the American 
left and right further apart (Levendusky 2013). Each of these factors have had polarizing impacts 
on our political system and appear detrimental to coexistence between parties.  
 
Section 2.3 Having a Conversation 
How deep are the divisions between the Democratic and Republican parties? Is the hatred 
between them significant enough to prevent any sort of dialogue with members of the opposing 
party? Scholarship on this issue reaches a variety of different conclusions. It’s possible that our 
divisions result not from tribalism but from “sincere disagreements over policy” (Webster and 
Abramowitz 2017, 635). These disagreements over issues are so fierce that they inspire 
emotional responses and affective polarization, but might be primarily confined to real 
disagreements over issues, not a simple hatred of “the other side.” Still, intense negative 
reactions to the opposing party might stem only from the strongest of partisans (Webster and 
Abramowitz 2017).  
Another possible explanation for these divides is that many Americans simply have a 
disdain for politics, rather than for a particular political party. Klar et al. (2018) suggest that 
some literature on affective polarization often conflates these two conclusions. Respondents to 
surveys on affective polarization may not dislike someone who is a vocal Republican because 
they are a liberal Democrat; however, they may dislike that individual because they have an 
aversion for politics and simply dislike how strongly politics pervades all aspects of American 
discourse. Perhaps, then, people are simply happier by avoiding conversations about politics, and 
are more willing to spend time with people who hold opposing political views as long as they do 
13 
not discuss politics (Klar et al. 2018). Although this social arrangement could produce a more 
civil relationship between partisans, it seems counterproductive to political discourse for 
individuals who disagree with each other to refrain from a discussion altogether. 
In contrast to the above explanations, some research indicates that citizens exhibit the 
most emotional reactions to political messages when “social identities line up behind partisan 
identities” (Mason 2016, 352). According to Mason, this social sorting can result in our refusal to 
accommodate or even listen to those on the other side of an issue. In turn, some citizens drift 
further and further away from each other. This refusal to listen to opposing viewpoints might 
lead us to only seek out news and opinion articles from sources that have partisan leanings, while 
factors such as social media and search engines help fuel this ideological divide. Although this 
behavior might not fully insulate us from hearing outgroup opinions, it’s clear that this social 
sorting contributes heavily to our ideological cleavages (Flaxman et al. 2016). 
The other side of this social sorting is that citizens may self-censor themselves in order 
not to distinguish themselves as a member of the opposing party. Hayes et al. (2006) define 
self-censorship loosely as one’s “reticence to express their opinions in a hostile opinion climate” 
(261). In other words, an individual might avoid discussing difficult issues for fear of censure or 
negative reactions from their peers. According to Hayes et al. (2006), those who self-censor also 
tend to be less politically active, since most expressions of political opinions, other than voting, 
have a public nature to them. For instance, a Trump supporter living in a predominantly 
Democratic community might withhold from wearing a “Make America Great Again” hat 
because of the risk of being ostracized by that community. Although like-minded conversations 
14 
have their benefits (Mutz 2002), self-censorship appears largely detrimental to American 
political discourse.  
From these ideological and affective differences emerge two types of citizenship: an 
idealized model and a realistic model. While an ideal citizen is open to broad discussions about 
issues and approaches opposing perspectives with an open mind, many might not be willing to 
do so in practice. In today’s politics, “calls for debate and open-mindedness are seen as efforts to 
delay and derail” and citizens tend to view compromise as a sign of weakness rather than as a 
sign of a successful, deliberative society (MacKuen et al. 2010, 440).  
However, research suggests that contemporary American politics still allow for less 
hostile debate if we approach it with a certain mindset. Often citizens will respond to opposing 
policy ideas with either aversion or anxiety. While aversion inspires a more negative reaction 
and an inclination to hold fast to one’s convictions, anxiety begets further investigation into an 
issue. Put differently, reacting in the latter way evokes a less intense, emotional response than the 
former (MacKuen et al. 2010; Weeks 2015). Furthermore, the anxious reaction towards outgroup 
policy ideas can motivate a desire to seek more information, therein opening citizens to the 
possibility of legitimate solutions coming from the other side of the aisle. Thus, affective 
polarization presents noticeable social barriers between partisans, although these barriers are not 
impossible to overcome. 
 
Section 2.4 Advanced Implications 
Of course, affective polarization extends beyond an emotional disdain for the outgroup. 
Research on the subject suggests affective polarization can act as a powerful motivator for our 
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economic and social behavior in a variety of contexts. It’s possible that such phenomena are 
occurring since partisanship has taken on a deeper meaning; rather than simply indicating one’s 
policy or party preferences, the term now seems to evoke one’s identity, values, and worldview. 
Just as aspects of identity such as race, ethnicity, and religion can strongly influence one’s 
actions, partisanship can also drive economic and nonpolitical behavior (McConnell et al. 2018). 
For example, one might demand a lower reservation wage when hired by ingroup partisans 
because they are effectively compensated further by the favorable work environment
Affective polarization remains salient even in relation to other divisive, though perhaps less 
serious, situations. For instance, Engelhardt and Utych (2018) find that college football fans 
demonstrate stronger price discrimination against outgroup partisans than against fans of the 
opposing team. Such results are striking given the passion of college football rivalries, 
particularly the Alabama-Auburn one used in their example. While in theory a Republican 
Alabama fan should be much more averse to selling his or her neighboring seats to an Auburn 
fan irrespective of that fan’s political affiliation, this study suggests that a Democrat would be 
more susceptible to price gouging in this scenario than a copartisan. Engelhardt and Utych 
(2018) argue that these “results suggest that the mere mention of partisan attachment is sufficient 
for it to shape outcomes in nonpolitical settings, but the question remains whether partisanship 
matters in areas where it is not mentioned at all” (18). This assertion recalls Hayes’ (et al. 2006) 
claims about self-censorship and the inevitably public nature of political activity. In this case, the 
fan’s identification as a member of a political party brought the issue to light for the ticket seller, 
opening the door for partisanship to motivate this fundamentally nonpartisan interaction.  
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Scholarship on affective polarization also suggests that our partisan leanings can trump 
even our own economic gain. In one study, respondents were offered the option of receiving $3 
for completing a survey or receiving $6 plus an additional $4 donated to their rival political 
party. According to McConnell et al. (2018), 75.4% of respondents were willing to turn down 
their own additional economic gains for the sake of preventing a further gain for the outgroup. 
When offered even more money matched with a donation to the opposing political party, only a 
small percentage (roughly 4%) of respondents reneged on their partisan affiliations to accept the 
money. A follow-up experiment confirms that intense partisan attitudes, not an aversion to 
politics, were the driving factor behind such behavior. In that study, roughly 85% of respondents 
chose to receive more money with a small sum also donated to their own political party 
(McConnell et al. 2018). Hence, strong partisan attitudes have a demonstrable impact on our 
economic behavior, regardless of whether this behavior has anything to do with politics in the 
first place. 
Likewise, this polarization contributes to how we view our peers on a number of levels. 
For one, affective polarization might impact our impressions of an individual’s attractiveness. 
One study from the 2012 election cycle shows that Democrats found an individual more 
attractive when he or she was introduced as an Obama supporter and less attractive when he or 
she was introduced as a Romney supporter. The same pattern occurred in reverse for Republican 
respondents. Not only did individuals find their co-partisans more attractive, they also expressed 
more negative feelings towards the descriptions of outgroup partisans (Nicholson et al. 2016).  
Even more powerful than attraction is our intense aversion to the opposing party, which 
can lead us as far as to dehumanize the other side. Scholarship on this topic highlights two main 
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ways of dehumanization: mechanistic dehumanization, which portrays the other side as “having 
no feelings” or “like robots,” as well as animalistic dehumanization, which deems the other side 
as “uncivilized” or “like animals” (Martherus et al. 2019, 18). Though the most polarized 
individuals are the most likely to dehumanize opposing partisans, citizens are much more likely 
to give outgroup members a lower rating on a feeling thermometer (see Iyengar et al. 2019) than 
to strongly dehumanize them in their opinions (Martherus et al. 2019).  
Cassese (2019) highlights that there are also two levels of dehumanization: subtle and 
blatant. While subtle dehumanization consists of both mechanistic and animalistic perceptions of 
the other party, blatant dehumanization was measured based on how evolved one thought 
members of the other party are. This scale ranged from “subhuman” beings from early in our 
species’ evolution to humans today (Cassese 2019, 9). Blatant dehumanization suggests a 
significant social and moral distance from outgroup partisans, so it’s possible that those who 
harbor such strong negative feelings reside in echo chambers, far from dissenting opposing 
viewpoints. Still, given the observational nature of this blatant dehumanization metric, it’s not 
worth focusing our concern on that matter (Cassese 2019).  
Conversely, it’s important to note that citizens may be more willing to demean outgroup 
partisans in animalistic terms rather than mechanistic ones (Martherus et al. 2019). We can 
observe this behavior on the national stage. Take President Trump’s infamous rhetoric on 
immigration: He opened his campaign accusing that Mexicans illegally immigrating to the 
United States were “bringing drugs, they’re bringing crime, they’re rapists, and some I assume 
are good people…” (Neate 2015). In 2018, Trump said “You wouldn’t believe how bad these 
people are. These aren’t people. These are animals” in reference to illegal immigrants, 
18 
specifically (according to President Trump) those who had come and became members of the 
MS-13 Gang (Qiu 2018). While these instances do not dehumanize on the basis of party 
affiliation, they do exemplify how today’s rhetoric can actively paint others as animals.  This 3
dehumanization as often been used against Trump as well, with many politicians and opinion 
articles describing his character with epithets that range from more human but demeaning ones 
(like “racist” and “sexist”) to animalistic ones that call him an outright “monster” (e.g. Jenkins 
2017).  
 
Section 2.5 Affective Polarization on College Campuses 
Political Beliefs on Campus 
How do these issues manifest on college campuses? Do college students seem open to 
grappling with opposing viewpoints? To consider this first question, it’s necessary to confront 
the perception of “liberal bias” on college campuses. While consensus indicates that the majority 
of professors vote Democratic, these professors are not necessarily “the lockstep, party-line 
lefties that you’ve read about in the national press” (Zimmerman 2016, 11). Moreover, 
professors have jumped further to the ideological left over time, as a comparable percentage of 
academics identified as Democrats (roughly 50 percent) in the 1950s and 1960s as do today. 
Zimmerman (2016) also downplays the perceived radicalism of professors, noting that the 
majority of those who identify as Marxists “came of age amid the revolutionary fervor of the 
1960s” (13). Thus, radicalism does not seem to be increasing as younger professors enter the 
field. 
3 As does the “deplorables” comment from Hillary Clinton, mentioned in Chapter 1. 
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Still, a certain liberal bias does fuel affective polarization in academia. Some 
conservative professors refrain from revealing their personal politics until receiving tenure, at 
which point they might still be ostracized from their colleagues once they are ideologically 
“out.” Consider the following example: 
When he was a junior professor, one conservative reported, a senior colleague 
flatly announced that no Republican would get tenure in his department. The 
professor bit his tongue until he was tenured, of course. Then he revealed his true 
politics, at which point several members of the department stopped talking to him 
(Zimmerman 2016, 14). 
 
Perhaps this situation is not the norm, yet it still seems shocking to see how far some might carry 
their distaste for outgroup partisans. Paradoxically, few professors would “openly [admit] a bias 
against racial minorities on campus…. By contrast, many faculty feel perfectly free to announce 
their prejudices against the political minority in their midst” (Zimmerman 2016, 14). From these 
accounts, we can see how college campuses might privilege liberal ideas while discounting 
conservative ones.  
Despite the validity of such qualitative evidence, it’s difficult to arrive at a conclusion on 
how prominent this anti-conservative bias is within university faculty. One survey found that 
Democrats “frequently” or “sometimes” self-censored slightly more than Republicans (30 
percent compared to 23 percent), although it also found that 35 percent of independents reported 
this level of self-censorship (Rothman et al. 2011). These results produce more questions than 
answers, namely whether independent voters fundamentally are worried about offending their 
fellow faculty members or if individuals with such concerns identify as independents for that 
very reason. As Rothman et al. (2011) suggest, “Identification as an ‘Independent’ may, itself, be 
an indication that one avoids taking positions” (179). Moreover, the implications of these 
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statistics are unclear because the survey it comes from analyzes schools from across the country. 
Liberal bias might be a bigger deal at elite liberal arts institutions, so the data might be skewed 
by the subjects included. Whatever the internal politics of a university might be, it’s possible that 
perceived left-leaning bias of professors is blown out of proportion. Zimmerman (2016) contends 
that “The more that conservatives attack the university, the less attractive it becomes as a career 
option to members of their own camp” (16). He might be correct, to an extent, that this is a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, but some of the attitudes of liberal professors detailed above seem 
ethically unjustifiable, especially if one of the goals of academia is to truly foster critical analysis 
of ideas. 
The other half of the “liberal bias” is the politics of the students themselves. In terms of 
party affiliation, Rothman et al. (2011) report that 32 percent of students identify themselves as 
supporters of the Democratic Party, while 26 percent side with the Republican Party. In general, 
students tend to have liberal views on social issues, such as climate change, abortion, or LGBTQ 
rights, yet many students “don’t fit our standard conceptions of ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ at all” 
(Zimmerman 2016, 17). Zimmerman and Rothman et al. cite students’ beliefs on issues such as 
afffirmative action, illegal immigration, and the death penalty as examples of student politics that 
might land to the right of traditional liberal beliefs or to the left of traditional conservative ones. 
In addition, many students might even feel disappointed with the state of American politics or an 
apathy towards their ability to make a difference (Zimmerman 2016).   4
 
 
4 In Chapter 4, I will investigate how this apathy might impact Bucknell University’s student body. 
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Political Correctness, Microaggressions, and Victimhood 
The most prominent, and perhaps most scrutinized, liberal beliefs on college campuses 
might stem from attitudes on political correctness and a plethora of areas that branch off of this 
concept, including microaggressions and victimhood. Political correctness generally refers to 
“efforts to replace unkind or offensive terms with more neutral ones” (Zimmerman 2016, 24). 
Over the course of the past half century, political correctness has sought to phase words out of 
our vocabulary in favor of “less stigmatizing” phrases, such as “disabled” for “crippled” or 
“Asian” for “Oriental” (Zimmerman 2016, 25). However, the concept extends far beyond 
obviously derogatory words. Starbucks, for example, used neutral red cups during the holiday 
season in 2015 to “welcome all of our stories” in place of their tradition to use cups that said 
“Merry Christmas” on them (Whitten 2015). The implication was that the traditional message 
excluded Americans who do not celebrate Christmas, though the politics of inclusivity ultimately 
drew ire from then presidential candidate Donald Trump, who suggested a boycott of the coffee 
company, and many Christian groups. Popular evangelist speaker Joshua Feuerstein went as far 
as to suggest that “in the age of political correctness, we’ve become so open-minded our brains 
have literally fallen out of our head” (Whitten 2015). As a result, a good intention to promote a 
nondenominational holiday message effectively sparked a “War on Christmas” in American 
popular culture. However, this case might better embody elite polarization than behavior 
prevalent among the general electorate. 
Still, this Starbucks case extends far beyond college campuses, but political correctness 
can pervade through academia as well. Some students may take issue with English syllabi that 
favor Western, white male authors over a more diverse selection of works (Zimmerman 2016). 
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Such a perspective suggests that students might be reading too much of Shakespeare and Hobbes 
without focusing on influential pieces by women and people of color. Moreover, political 
correctness seems to label certain ideas as taboo in academia. One of the more famous instances 
of this occurred in 2006, when Harvard University’s president Larry Summers contended that 
“one possible explanation for the lack of women in science fields might be attributed to 
differences in intrinsic aptitude” (Rothman et al. 2011, 160). Reacting to what was presumably 
interpreted as a statement discounting female intellect, the Harvard faculty ousted Summers that 
same year. Reports suggest that Summers’ statement was far from the start of his divide with the 
university’s faculty, but expressing this idea fueled the motivation to remove him from office.  
Fifteen years prior to Summers’ removal, President George H.W. Bush observed how 
political correctness represents a double-edged sword in a speech at the University of Michigan. 
During this commencement address, Bush argued that “although the [political correctness] arises 
from the laudable desire to sweep away the debris of racism and sexism and hatred, it replaces 
old prejudice with new ones….” (Rothman et al. 2011, 162). In other words, the quest to rid our 
vocabulary of symbols of discrimination create a new oppression, or even “censorship” in Bush’s 
words, against those with opposing viewpoints or who are not as careful with their word choice. 
Bush added that “disputants treat sheer force, getting their foes punished or expelled for instance, 
as a substitute for the power of ideas. They’ve invited people to look for an insult in every word, 
gesture, action” (Rothman et al. 2011, 162). Bush’s speech seems to directly foreshadow 
Summers’ downfall at Harvard. Moreover, his remarks forecast the state of political discourse on 
college campuses taking place over a quarter century later.  
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The possibility of an insult in every word, as Bush mentions, begins to explain 
microaggressions. Stated differently, microaggressions “are small actions or word choices that 
seem on their face to have no malicious intent but that are thought of as a kind of violence 
nonetheless” (Lukianoff and Haidt 2015). Some microaggressions represent more obvious and 
contentious offenses, such as how Summers’ suggestion about women in science implies a 
gender disparity in affinity for the hard sciences. Summers likely did not intend to demean 
women’s intellectual capabilities with his remarks, but it seems clear how such an assertion 
could be interpreted in this way. Other microaggressions may be less clear in how they embody 
violence. For instance, the phrase “you guys” directed towards a group of males and females has 
been identified as a microaggression (Campbell and Manning 2018). The offense in this case is 
to refer to the mixed group as a masculine whole, though this complaint appears to nitpick at a 
phrase used colloquially by countless individuals rather than point out a true bias or lack of 
perspective as seen in the Summers example.  
Campbell and Manning (2018) suggest that microaggressions have created a new “moral 
culture” marked by hypersensitivity, the need to “handle conflicts through complaints to 
authorities and other third parties,” and the cultivation of “an image of being victims who 
deserve assistance” (11). On college campuses, such a culture can establish a limited spectrum 
for acceptable stances in debate. Even if political correctness seeks to protect students from hate 
speech, some interpret efforts to avoid microaggressions as a way of insulating students from 
real world problems (Lukianoff and Haidt 2015).  
The above literature makes it clear that the culture of political correctness has many 
critics, but how does it impact students? A 2017 YouGov survey reached 1,250 undergraduates 
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at both two-year and four-year colleges to uncover results. While this sample is representative of 
the college population overall, it might not fully capture behavior seen at elite institutions which 
tend to play host to more speech-related controversy. According to this survey, an overwhelming 
majority of students were generally comfortable sharing their ideas and opinions in college 
classrooms. However, on the more extreme ends of the ideological spectrum, very liberal 
students felt significantly more comfortable than very conservative students about speaking their 
mind in class (about 14 percentage points higher).  In addition, over half of survey respondents 5
felt that they have exhibited self-censorship in the classroom, preventing themselves from 
expressing their true viewpoints (FIRE 2017). The latter statistics, particularly on 
self-censorship, hint at the effect of political correctness and the consequences of 
microaggressions on college students. A similar 2019 study confirms how much influence this 
culture holds. The most telling statistic finds that “57% of students think colleges should be able 
to restrict student expression of political views that seem hurtful or offensive” (FIRE 2019, 3).  6
It’s possible to interpret these results as an endorsement of political correctness, or that students 
want action taken against those who hold potentially controversial views.  
Some may defend the value in stopping particularly hateful views from permeating 
campuses, but Campbell and Manning (2018) would argue that this response fits the mold they 
describe: students looking for a third party, their college administration, to deal with situations 
they feel victimized by. Irrespective of this argument, it seems that political correctness can 
significantly affect discourse on campus both in theory and in practice. Zimmerman (2016) 
affirms this notion, highlighting research that finds how liberal arts students may either feel 
5 I will revisit this idea with qualitative data in Chapter 4. 
6 This question as well as others from both the 2017 and 2019 FIRE reports will be discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 3. 
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silenced by the basis of discussion or be fearful of the “ridicule” they might face for “expressing 
unpopular opinions” (35). Ultimately, hostility towards these viewpoints seems paradoxical, 
given that a majority of college students and faculty see the exploration of new ideas as one of 
the central purposes of higher education (Rothman et al. 2011).  
 
The 2016 Election and its Aftermath on Campus 
The above issues do not occur in a vacuum, and the clear inflection point for many of 
these developments is the 2016 presidential election. Following confirmation of Trump’s victory, 
protests and walkouts occurred at a number of universities across the country. Among other 
complaints about the president-elect’s qualifications and character, many students expressed how 
they no longer felt safe. For some, these qualms stemmed from anxiety for the future of the 
country. For others, their worries demonstrated a serious concern for their livelihood in the wake 
of the election (Mele and Correal 2016). One social media post shared across all demographics 
but especially visible to college students stated “IF YOU VOTED FOR TRUMP TODAY, make 
sure to explain to your LGBT+, female, black, latino/a, Muslim friends why they don’t matter to 
you.” Evidently, this outcry only tells one side of the story, that of more vocal Democrats who 
vehemently opposed Trump’s candidacy. However, these examples do encapsulate the 
sentiments that reverberated across campuses on election night and beyond. 
College administrations also took action to support students distraught by the election 
results. Across the country, universities released statements supporting diversity on campus and 
held events that invited students to reflect or vent (Dickerson and Saul 2016). At Harvard, 
President Drew Faust- ironically, the president who succeeded Summers- opened her office to all 
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“concerned students” who wished to speak with her (Campbell and Manning 2018, xii). These 
acts of solidarity responded in part to immature acts by Trump supporters on campus, ranging 
from driving around campuses with Trump flags to derogatory comments towards minority 
students to literally spitting at Clinton supporters protesting on campus (Dickerson and Saul 
2016).  
On the one hand, colleges’ responses to the election seem appropriate given the worries 
of their students. At the time, many students felt threatened by Trump’s rhetoric and behavior on 
the campaign trail. To this group, his election was an endorsement of such actions. On the other 
hand, such analysis discounts the fact that the 2016 election presented two historically unpopular 
candidates, effectively leaving Americans with a choice of “the lesser of two evils” (Long 2016). 
Therefore, Trump’s victory did not necessarily mean the public’s endorsement of his baggage. 
Rather, more Americans in key states might have felt that he represented the slightly better 
option in a choice between a loud-mouthed reality television star an establishment politician 
attached to a number of controversies. Furthermore, some would contend that administrative 
responses to the election were unnecessary and shield students from grappling with serious 
issues (e.g. Lukianoff and Haidt 2015).  
Given this backdrop for politics on college campuses, one can understand why political 
correctness and the vocal reaction to the 2016 election might create intense divisions on campus. 
Perhaps these divisions are quite noticeable, particularly when students gather to advocate for or 
against critical policy developments in Washington or to protest controversial speakers visiting 
campus (see Zimmerman 2016, Campbell and Manning 2018). Or maybe these divisions go 
largely unseen, as students refrain from expressing their true beliefs for fear that outing 
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themselves will ostracize them from classmates or even friends. The qualitative research 
component of my thesis aims to investigate this question and explore the attitudes and divisions 
that affect political discourse on college campuses. 
 
Section 2.6 Conclusion 
At the national level, American political parties seem more divided than ever. Although 
scholarship once suggested the benefits of more polarized parties, the transition from the loose 
coalitions of the mid-20th century to the hyperpartisan behavior in Washington today has 
demonstrated the severe effects of such a system. Sometimes our elected representatives or 
regular citizens are able to overcome these differences, but polarization often creates barriers that 
extend far beyond the realm of actual policy. Ultimately, party affiliation can influence social 
behavior, causing one to treat another differently on the basis of their political beliefs despite the 
apolitical nature of a situation.  
Affective polarization also manifests on college campuses. Some divisions appear in the 
form of actual ideological differences among faculty or students on public policy issues. Others 
stem from concerns about political correctness and maintaining a particular environment on 
campus. In 2016, these factors combined to produce intense reactions to the results of the 
presidential election. As colleges struggle to bridge the gap between both sides of the ideological 
spectrum, students feel uncomfortable expressing their true opinions for risk of backlash from 
their peers or professors. While an overarching solution is necessary to reduce hatred between 
opposing camps, it’s particularly critical to address this problem on college campuses, places 
intended to foster respectful debate and to challenge students to grapple with important issues.  
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Chapter 3: Quantitative Research  
Section 3.1 Overview 
Having reviewed a breadth of scholarship on affective polarization, I will now highlight 
national survey data that reflects college students attitudes on the topic. I will draw mainly from 
two surveys conducted by the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) and one 
conducted by the Bucknell Institute for Public Policy (BIPP). The first FIRE study, titled 
“Speaking Freely,” was published in 2017 and focuses on “what students think about expression 
at American colleges.” It surveys 1,250 undergraduate students from both two-year and four-year 
colleges. The second FIRE study, “What Students Think About,” was published in 2019 and 
explores similar themes of expression and association on college campuses. This study uses 
YouGov survey data from 2,225 undergraduate students, also from both two-year and four-year 
colleges. The BIPP survey hits on similar issues, supplementing data found in FIRE’s research. 
However, the BIPP survey is a nationally representative survey (with a sample of 1,200 
respondents) that includes respondents who are college students, faculty, and the general 
population.  
This section will begin with anecdotal evidence of affective polarization on college 
campuses before analyzing specific data from national surveys. I will also break down the 
significance of these results based on factors such as political affiliation, ideology, race, and 
gender. The goal of this chapter will be to find patterns of agreement and disagreement along 
these subgroups of the student population. This quantitative data will then be used to guide my 
qualitative research on Bucknell students, providing points of further investigation or raising 
questions that may be best answered by real discussions rather than through a survey lab. 
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Section 3.2 Setting the Scene- Guest Speakers 
Though political activism might become more prevalent on college campuses during 
election cycles, one of the best thermometers for student’s opinions is their reactions to guest 
speakers on campus and to national news stories. For instance, when right-wing political 
commentator Ben Shapiro came to speak at Boston University in November of 2019, he was met 
by hecklers in the audience and protesters outside the event. Some interrupted Shapiro’s speech 
with shouts or whistles, while others walked out of the event (or were escorted out of the event 
by security). The talk, “America wasn’t built on slavery, it was built on freedom,” drew ire from 
the group Black BU as well as other student organizations. Shapiro had been criticized in the 
past for his views on race, and “urged attendees to ‘stop conflating the past’ history of slavery 
‘with the present’” (Saric 2019). The student group that invited him, Young Americans for 
Freedom, stated that “Ben Shapiro has repeatedly and vehemently condemned racism, and he is 
by no means denying the historical existence and significance of slavery” (Saric 2019). 
Regardless of the merits (or lack thereof) of Shapiro’s speech, his message was clearly 
controversial. Still, given that Shapiro runs the right-wing ​Daily Wire ​website and is somewhat 
known for provoking the left (Tavernise 2017), the reactions he was met with should not have 
come as a surprise. 
However, it’s not just provocateurs who can be met with student outrage. In 2014, former 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was invited to give Rutgers University’s commencement 
address. University President Robert Barchi said to the Rutgers community that “Whatever your 
personal feelings or political views about our commencement speaker, there can be no doubt that 
Condoleezza Rice is one of the most influential intellectual and political figures of the last 50 
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years” (Fitzsimmons 2014). Rice was the first female to serve as National Security Advisor 
(2001-2005) and the first African-American female to serve as Secretary of State (2005-2009), 
both under the Bush administration. Her resume suggests she was a trailblazer who paved the 
way for women in politics who would come later, particularly in the national security sector.  
Ultimately, the student body felt Rice’s involvement in the Iraq War outweighed her 
credentials for delivering a moving commencement speech. Students pressured Brachi and 
faculty condemned her invitation until Rice decided not to follow through with the speech, not 
wanting to become a “distraction” for the graduating students and their families (Fitzsimmons 
2014). While it’s possible that some in the Rutgers community were simply averse to a politician 
speaking at commencement, Rice was far from an ideologue. Moreover, complaints of Rice’s 
role in the Bush administration’s ulterior motives for the invasion of Iraq, while valid, might 
place a disproportionate amount of the blame on Rice compared to other American leaders who 
pushed heavily for military action.  Ironically, when President Obama spoke at Rutgers’ 7
commencement ceremony two years later, he criticized the university community for their 
response to Rice’s invitation. In his speech, Obama noted that while he too disagreed with Rice’s 
policies, it would be “misguided” to declare that it was not worth listening to her perspective 
(Tani 2016).  
It’s not just conservative figures who students are protesting against for speaking on 
campus. Madeleine Albright, who served as Secretary of State under President Clinton and 
became the first female in history to lead the State Department, faced backlash from students for 
7 ​History has not reflected well on then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney for 
their roles in this effort, wanting perhaps to “finish the job” after the George H.W. Bush administration stopped 
before taking out Saddam Hussein once and for all. 
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her 2016 commencement speech at Scripps College.  Albright’s visit was controversial both for 8
her recent comments about female support for Hillary Clinton and, similar to Rice, for events she 
oversaw while at the State Department (Sahagun 2016). Moreover, Drexel University Professor 
George Ciccariello-Maher resigned after a series of controversial, far-left tweets, including 
remarks that disrespected the military and a post that read “All I Want for Christmas is White 
Genocide” (Gray 2017). The Drexel campus (and the internet) quickly punished 
Ciccariello-Maher for his statements, making his departure inevitable. Overall, these examples 
seem to suggest that guest speakers must walk a tightrope, both prior to and during their visit, to 
appear acceptable to a university community. Controversial guest speakers are not a new 
phenomena on college campuses (e.g. Rothman et al. 2011, Zimmerman 2017), but their 
appearances and the reactions they are met with have attracted a lot more attention in recent 
years (Lukianoff and Haidt 2015).  
 
Section 3.3 College Students on Guest Speakers 
Are these examples representative of how college students react to speakers? Can this 
really speak to the level of polarization on college campuses? On the one hand, FIRE research 
found that 93% of students agree that their college should invite a variety of guest speakers to 
campus (2017). Additionally, over half (64%) of students reported changing an attitude or 
opinion on an issue after hearing what a guest speaker has to offer. Meanwhile, just 2% of 
respondents said that they would make noise to disrupt these events (FIRE 2017). In principal, 
8 ​Albright also delivered the commencement address at Bucknell University in 2019.  
32 
this would suggest that students are not only open to guest speakers with whom they disagree on 
important issues, many of them actually benefit from listening to such opposing viewpoints.  
On the other hand, national survey data tells a different story. In part of BIPP’s nationally 
representative survey, they tested reactions to three different guest speakers suggesting the 
importance of free expression and speech on campus. Respondents were told that the speaker 
was either President Obama, Vice President Mike Pence, or a University president. In the neutral 
condition, about three-quarters of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents supported the 
University president’s ideal. There was a gap between male support (79%) and female support 
(68%) of the speech’s message, but given the partisan implications of the other conditions this 
data may serve better as a baseline than as evidence of general attitudes towards free expression. 
In the Obama condition, we begin to see partisan divides in the reactions to this message. A 
sizable majority (83%) of Democrats supported the idea of free expression when presented by 
the former president, while just over half (58%) of Republicans and two-thirds of Independents 
(67%) agreed with the sentiment. For the Pence condition, the results flip along partisan lines. 
Only 58% of Democrats agreed in this condition with Pence’s points about free expression while 
a substantial number of Republicans (85%) supported it. Independents also sided slightly more 
with Pence in this condition (70%) than in the Obama condition (BIPP 2017).  
Ultimately, the above results suggest that students are more open to free expression when 
it is advocated for by someone of their own party. Even though a majority of each subgroup 
agreed with this message in all conditions, the disparity between partisan responses shows how 
the message resonates more from figures with whom we already agree. Moreover, respondents 
were more likely to feel lukewarm about free expression if the message came from an outgroup 
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partisan. In the Pence condition, over one-third (35%) of Democrats neither agreed nor disagreed 
with the message of his statement, while only 15% of Republicans reported this indecision. In 
the Obama condition, we again see inverse results, as 33% of Republicans neither agreed nor 
disagreed with the free expression sentiment as opposed to 15% of Democrats. For reference, 
about 20% of both partisan groups expressed this indecision in the control situation (BIPP 2017). 
Overall, partisans appear more willing to support free speech when an ingroup partisan advocates 
for it, while outgroup partisans tend to be more indecisive on the subject. Keeping in mind the 
prior examples, we can imagine that Obama’s speech at Rutgers was mostly directed at liberal 
students who had previously rejected Condoleezza Rice’s appearance, although conservative 
students may have still been more skeptical of his comments. On the opposite end of the 
ideological spectrum, Shapiro might have had a difficult time convincing liberal students to 
listen to his perspective as his calls for different perspectives resonated with conservative 
students. Nevertheless, the end of this section will demonstrate evidence contrary to the 
hypothesis that partisans are more receptive to ingroup members than outgroup ones. 
 
Withdrawing Invitations and Hate Speech 
A majority of students (56%) think there are times when an institution should withdraw a 
guest speaker’s invitation. Possible reasons for disinvitation include a speaker’s history of 
criminal activity or professional misconduct, a lack of security at the event, or an abundance of 
protesters against the event. Nevertheless, the most prominent reason students would want an 
invitation withdrawn is if the speaker has made racist or hateful comments. Over two-thirds 
(69%) of students agreed with this reasoning, perhaps including those who reacted so sharply to 
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Shapiro at Boston University and Albright at Scripps College. This logic extends across virtually 
all subgroups of students. Very liberal students expressed the most support (79.2%) for this 
reasoning, while over half of conservative students at the other end of the spectrum (56.2%) also 
agreed. Male students (60.4%) were less likely than their female peers (75%) to view racist or 
hateful comments as cause for a withdrawn invitation, though this difference seems more or less 
negligible given that both overwhelmingly supported this reasoning. One interesting finding 
from the FIRE survey was that white students (71.4%) were slightly more likely to treat racist or 
hateful comments as grounds for disinvitation than black (70.7%) or Hispanic (65.2%) students 
(FIRE 2017). Although it seems curious that students of color did not provide as strong of a 
response as white students, the small margin between them might indicate this is more an 
anomaly than a significant point.  
While strong reactions to a guest speaker who has made such comments in the past are 
understandable, they may also be shortsighted. For one, less than half (46%) of survey 
respondents recognize that the First Amendment protects hate speech and about one-third (31%) 
of those students think that hate speech should not be protected. More than half of conservative 
(55%) and very conservative (58%) students were aware of this protection, compared to less than 
half of liberal and very liberal students. The same pattern plays out, though with less of a gap 
between them, when comparing Republican and Democratic students. Looking at these same 
groups’ opinions, over 60% of liberal and very liberal students and over 55% of each Democratic 
subgroup (i.e. strong, weak, and lean Democratic) said that hate speech should not be protected 
under the First Amendment. Aside from the strongest partisans, conservative and Republican 
students fell somewhere in the middle on this issue, with no resounding preference for or against 
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this protection (FIRE 2017). This survey data points to two possible conclusions. First, 
conservative and Republican students have a better understanding of free speech issues than 
liberal and Democratic students. Second, left-leaning students appear to be far more inclined to 
reject hate speech, or what they perceive as hate speech, than right-leaning students. In the 
following chapter, I attempt to find qualitative evidence whether questions of hate speech on 
campus truly skew in these directions. 
While a student may find a speaker’s history or ideas objectionable, that does not make 
these actions wrong in the eyes of the law. Of course, many students- myself included- might be 
unsettled that a university has invited a speaker with such a track record. Students are entitled to 
their own opinion, but it’s possible that activity leads to these negative reactions against 
speakers. Other FIRE survey data on peer to peer interactions help illustrate this point. For 
instance, fewer students might try to understand the point of view of their peers when they hear 
an offensive statement (35%) than when they hear a statement with which they strongly disagree 
(59%). In other words, students are less likely to comprehend a viewpoint that they find hurtful 
or racist (FIRE 2017). Yet these perceptions are unique to each student; what is offensive to one 
student might not be to another. Since indications of racism or hatred are different for each 
student, a speaker might have little margin for error in their past comments and ideas to be 






Benefits of Open Expression 
Public figures have spoken out against the negative reception that some speakers are met 
with. In 2016, President Obama delivered the commencement address at Rutgers and criticized 
the university community for withdrawing Condaleezza Rice’s invitation two years earlier:  
“I don’t think it’s a secret that I disagree with many of the policies of Dr. Rice 
and the previous administration. But the notion that this community or this 
country would be better served by not hearing a former secretary of state or not 
hearing what she had to say ​— I believe that’s misguided,” Obama said. “I don’t 
think that’s how democracy works best, when we’re not even willing to listen to 
each other” (Tani 2016)  
 
For Obama, students stand to gain more by listening to a regarded speaker than by refusing to 
listen to her perspective. While students might vehemently disagree with an opinion, they can 
still benefit from hearing out the other side. And as the above research shows, students might 
leave an event with an understanding of how a speaker can hold views so different from their 
own, or even agreeing to an extent with the speaker. In a similar vein, Madeleine Albright told 
Scripps graduates that she sought not to “defend a particular policy, but to talk about the 
importance of h​earing from — and actually listening to — all perspectives” (Sahagun 2016). 
Even if a guest speaker leaves an audience member feeling the same way about an issue, there 
appears to be value in hearing that perspective. 
It’s possible that this logic falls short for true provocateurs, but does hold up for most 
established speakers. Some might place Shapiro in the former category, while most would argue 
that Milo Yiannopolous (whose polemical nature has inspired fierce protests during visits to the 
detriment of all students’ safety) lies squarely within it. Such invitations might be unproductive, 
yet guest speakers are often far less controversial than made out to be. As mentioned at the 
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beginning of this section, about 64% of students reported having changed their attitude or 
opinion after attending a guest speakers event. This includes 56% of very liberal students, 71% 
of liberal students, and 68% of moderates. About 65% of strong Democrats and 71% of weak 
Democrats shared this response. Such results do not promise that a student will enter opposed 
and leave in support of a guest speaker’s message; however, they do confirm that the majority of 
students stand to gain more from listening to a guest speaker than from avoiding or protesting 
one. As Obama and Albright assert, there is substantial value in attempting to understand 
opposing perspectives. 
 
Section 3.4 College Students and Charlottesville 
Just as attitudes toward guest speakers provide insight into the minds of college students, 
so too can their reactions to current events. The 2019 FIRE report asked their sample of college 
students their opinion on the violent protests in August 2017 between white nationalists and 
counter-protesters in Charlottesville, Virginia. White nationalists had organized a “Unite the 
Right” rally protesting the removal of a statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee in a 
Charlottesville park. Police cancelled the event and dispersed protestors from the park, leading 
white nationalists to spread throughout the city as tensions rose between them and 
counter-protesters. This violence culminated with a car crashing into a group of 
counter-protesters, killing a 32-year-old woman and injuring 19 others (Belkin, Kesling, and 
McWhirter 2017).  
The FIRE survey results suggest that “students’ opinions on whether individuals should 
be able to engage in peaceful protest depends on who is protesting” (FIRE 2019, 18). According 
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to the results, nearly three-quarters (71%) of students agreed that those protesting against white 
nationalists should be allowed to do so peacefully. Meanwhile, just over half (52%) of 
respondents felt the white nationalists should be allowed to protest peacefully (FIRE 2019). Even 
though a majority of students recognize each group’s right to protest, they clearly sympathize 
more with the counter-protester cause. This should be expected given that respondents know in 
hindsight that the protesters’ violence caused the death of a civilian. While the question asked 
about allowing each side to “peacefully protest,” it’s inherently difficult to separate that ideal 
from the tragedy that actually occurred. Also, the “white nationalist” cause of the protestors 
likely prevented some from viewing their cause in a positive light, regardless of their right to free 
assembly.  
At least two-thirds of each partisan group would allow those protesting against the white 
nationalists to do so peacefully. With Democrats and Independents, there was a more noticeable 
gap between their support for peaceful counter-protests and their support for peaceful white 
nationalist protests (28% for Democrats and 17% for Independents). About 68% of Republican 
students supported the peaceful counter-protests while just 3% less (65%) shared this view 
towards the white nationalists. Roughly half of students of color (49% of blacks and 50% of 
Hispanics) surveyed support the peaceful protests of white nationalist, a statistic that may seem 
lukewarm considering the motivations of these protesters. This support lags far behind that for 
the counter-protesters- 67% of blacks and 70% of Hispanics- but still feels surprisingly high 
(FIRE 2019). Overall, students were more likely to approve of the counter-protests than the 
white nationalist protests themselves, though more conservative and Republican students were 
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more inclined to support both causes. This finding appears consistent with right-leaning students’ 
recognition of hate speech as expression protected by the First Amendment (FIRE 2017).   9
Finally, the FIRE survey investigated whether the events in Charlottesville had changed 
attitudes about speech and protest on campus. For the most part, the violence did not change 
students’ attitudes; only about 35% of respondents reported changes in their views on campus 
either speech or protest. Results remained consistent across ideology, party identity, and gender. 
Along racial divides, however, there was a 15% gap between black students and their white peers 
who reported changing their attitude on campus expression (FIRE 2019). The subject matter of 
the Charlottesville protests helps explain this gap, though it appears the events had little impact 
on students except along racial lines. Small gaps between left-leaning and right-leaning 
responses might shed light on affective polarization, but such evidence speaks more to general 
opinions on the protesters and counter-protesters.  
 
Section 3.5 Political Attitudes on Campus  
Having examined what college students think about guest speakers and current events, 
we can now look further into their opinions on general expression on campus. Over half (54%) 
of students reported that they have stopped themselves from sharing opinions in classes. 
Although the most common reported reason for self-censorship was a worry of being mistaken, 
just under half (48%) of students thought that students might judge them for their opinions and 
about one-third (30%) of students felt others might see their views as offensive (FIRE 2017).  
9 ​See Section 3.3.  
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It’s easy to imagine how this self-censorship plays out in college classrooms. Perhaps a 
liberal student (or professor) expresses dismay for a certain conservative policy on race. A 
conservative student in the class might want to voice a dissenting opinion, but fears that adding 
their two cents might come across as closed-minded at best or “racist” at worst. In such a 
scenario the calculus is simple; it makes more sense to withhold one’s opinion rather than to face 
potentially harsh judgment from peers. The reverse situation (a liberal student hesitant to share 
amongst a conservative crowd) could produce similar troubles, though survey data indicates that 
comfort in the classroom skews in a liberal direction. In fact, very liberal students were 21% 
more comfortable sharing their opinions in the classroom than their very conservative peers 
(FIRE 2017).  
Such behavior extends beyond the classroom as well. According to FIRE’s research, 
about 44% of students reported to have stopped themselves from sharing an opinion outside of 
the classroom. Closer inspection of ideological subgroups on this question reflects the opposite 
side of very liberal students’ comfort. Nearly two-thirds (63%) of very conservative students 
reported this self-censorship, compared to about half (51%) of very liberal students. Curiously, 
fear of backlash appears more tied to ideology than to party. Students who lean Republican said 
they stopped themselves from sharing at a higher rate (61%) than weak or strong Republicans 
(57% each). Perhaps those who more vocally identify as Republican are more self-assured in 
their beliefs. However, the more likely explanation is that those who were less willing to admit 
their party preference on the survey would also be less willing to share their thoughts on 
important issues. 
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Another interesting finding from this question is that almost half (48%) of college seniors 
self-censored outside of the classroom while just 38% of first-year students did so (FIRE 2017). 
It’s unclear why students withhold from expressing their opinions over time. Maybe students 
come into college more energized to argue their positions, but over time they feel their 
arguments falling on deaf ears or producing negative reactions. Or perhaps students eventually 
just want to put politics and other issues on the back-burner outside of the classroom, preferring 
cordiality to controversial arguments.  
Whatever the case, this behavior does not happen in a vacuum. The severe affective 
polarization seen along the 2016 presidential campaign likely warded off some students’ 
willingness to share their opinions, both at the time of this survey and beyond. Yet this argument 
fails to explain why roughly half of students in each ideological, racial, and gender subgroup 
reported self-censorship. Hence, an additional reason for the prevalence of self-censorship is that 
a small subset of students create an atmosphere where students are afraid to share dissenting 
opinions. Even if many students are politically engaged, they might feel threatened to express 
opinions deviating from the precedents set by their most vocal peers. It’s as if these students are 
acting as Fiorina’s elites, in this case polarizing the classroom and leaving the general student 
population to choose between agreement, silence, or resentment. 
 
Hypocrisy and Student Atmosphere 
Hypocrisy lies somewhere in the college student population’s attitudes towards 
expression and tolerance. According to the FIRE 2019 survey, “What Students Think About,” a 
decisive majority of students (89%) think it’s important for their institution to encourage students 
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to openly share their ideas and opinions among each other. Moreover, three-quarters of 
respondents (75%) feel that free speech should be allowed on campus regardless of whether that 
speech offends other members of the community. At the same time, a majority of students (57%) 
believed colleges should have the ability to restrict expression of “hurtful” or “offensive” 
political views. While about half of most subgroups agreed with this statement, the most 
resounding support came from left-leaning groups and minorities. Roughly 63% of Democrats 
and 64% of very liberal students would grant this responsibility to colleges, compared to about 
51% of Republicans and 56% of Independents. Just over half (51%) of white students agree, 
noticeably less than black (68%) and Hispanic (65%) students (FIRE 2019).  
Such details do not suggest that restricting speech is simply a wish of the “woke” 
students on the left. When differentiating by strength of responses, over 30% of very 
conservative students “strongly agree” with this proposition. In comparison, just 26% of very 
liberal students “strongly agree” along with about 20% of liberals, conservatives, and moderates. 
These results suggest that affective polarization can touch all ideologies on campus; it’s not just 
one side that feels strong hostility towards the other. Furthermore, the only ideological or racial 
subgroup that recorded a more forceful endorsement were black students, of whom 34% strongly 
agreed with the statement (FIRE 2019). It seems the takeaway from this data is that those who 
feel strongest about restricting offensive language tend to be those with the most extreme 
ideological positions (or those likely to be the targets of such language).  
The data from the 2017 BIPP national survey delves further into the details of student 
thoughts on restricting speech. Rather than focusing on the general idea of restricting speech, this 
data targets specific categories of speech. Such data is useful to determine the issues students are 
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most (or least) supportive of restricting. For instance, nearly 90% of both Democrats and 
Republicans support restricting speech that threatens violence against others- a logical answer 
given the implications of such a message. Such consensus does not extend to other issues. Nearly 
two-thirds (63%) of Democrats think colleges should be able to restrict speech that might be 
perceived as offensive to minorities compared with just one-third (33%) of Republicans and 
about 38% of Independents.  
Likewise, a majority (56%) of Democrats said that colleges should be able to restrict 
speech that may be perceived as sexist, while just about one-third of Republicans and 
Independents (35% and 34%, respectively) would support this measure. There is not as large of a 
gap on the issue of language that might make certain students feel uncomfortable or unsafe, 
perhaps because this option opens the door for more unsettling speech as highlighted in the 
“threat of violence” option. While 60% of Democrats supported this restriction, nearly half 
(46%) of Republicans supported it as well (BIPP 2017).  
Finally, the BIPP survey asked whether colleges should be able to restrict speech that 
challenges the dominant political perspective on campus. In this case, all partisan groups offered 
a resounding rejection. Two-thirds (66%) of Democrats and three-quarters of Republicans and 
Independents (76% and 75%, respectively) responded that colleges should not reject such speech 
(BIPP 2017). At first glance, this appears to reflect more consensus and common ground 
between partisan camps. Upon further analysis, however, this response affirms students’ 
hypocrisy. Even though Democrats here convey an openness to other perspectives, they 
implicitly reject those perspectives by showing strong support for restricting speech that may be 
perceived as sexist, racist, or discomforting. I do not mean to make a normative judgment on 
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speech embodying those characteristics. Rather, I mean to suggest that certain forms of speech 
critical towards the dominant political perspective might be perceived as connoting such traits. 
Consequently, these perspectives might be labeled as “sexist,” “racist,” or “discomforting.” In 
theory, students might be wary of boxing out certain ideologies, but the same survey evidence 
shows that they may do so regularly.  
This sentiment also extends to extracurricular involvement. About 70% of respondents 
think students “should be excluded from extracurricular activities if they publicly express 
intolerant, hurtful, or offensive viewpoints” (FIRE 2019, 7). Although a majority of all 
ideological subgroups agreed with the statement, the strongest responses came from very liberal 
and liberal students. An overwhelming 85% of very liberal students and 74% of liberal students 
supported this statement. Over 60% of moderate, conservative, and very conservative students 
stand by this statement as well, so we cannot assume that protecting against hurtful viewpoints is 
a wholly liberal project. Nevertheless, the resounding support from very liberal students is 
indicative of similar behavior found in the survey that seems to privilege those perspectives over 
others. 
 
Additional Disparities Between Parties 
Thus, students seem to believe in open expression of ideas except for those with which 
they disagree. It’s not particularly surprising that they would counter an idealistic view of free 
expression with opinions that contradict that view. Defining offensive and hurtful language tends 
to be a subjective matter. Furthermore, while responses from the survey on free expression and 
restricting expression are mutually exclusive in theory, they do not guarantee such results in 
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practice. Due to this lack of dichotomy, nearly 90% of students claim the importance of free 
expression while more than half (55%) also believe that “the climate on campus makes it 
difficult for students to have conversations about important issues such as race, politics, and 
gender” (FIRE 2019, 7).  
Although a majority of students report an uncomfortable climate for discussion, 
Republican students seem to be disproportionately affected. They are 14% more likely than 
Democratic students to think the campus climate is not conducive to having civil conversations 
about key issues (FIRE 2019). At the same time, three-quarters of Republicans (75%) and 
Independents (68%) said that college students are too easily offended. These statistics are 
significantly greater than the overall data and the Democratic reaction; about 58% of all 
respondents and a minority of Democrats (43%) agreed that college students are too easily 
offended. Male and female responses demonstrate a similar gap in support (65% compared to 
51%, respectively), but this disparity seems less telling than the partisan one because a majority 
of both subgroups still agreed with the statement (BIPP 2017).  
These results seem to confirm the prior data regarding self-censorship. Since very liberal 
students felt significantly more comfortable sharing their opinions than very conservative 
students, it would make sense that Republican students report a more hostile climate for 
discussion and an environment in which students are too easily offended. Evidently, comparing 
the two extreme ends of the ideological spectrum might not be fully representative of how 
students of both parties feel about free expression. Nevertheless, this data still provides an idea 
of biases against and animosity towards certain viewpoints on campus.  
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Section 3.6 Conclusion 
The survey results reviewed in this chapter demonstrate a few areas of agreement across 
ideological and partisan lines. Some of this consensus came on tangible issues such as the 
disinvitation of guest speakers based on stains in their background. However, most agreement 
came on abstract issues of free expression and peaceful protest. On these issues, there was a 
much greater variety in what students claim to believe versus how they actually behave. Students 
appear to support an ideal but contradict that support with other survey responses. Given the 
subjective nature of the survey questions, some hypocritical responses should be expected. Still, 
it’s interesting to find that students, especially left-leaning ones, are mostly unaware of these 
contradictions.  
These results also add an important perspective for political scientists’ debates on elite 
and mass polarization. For instance, the BIPP survey data found students taking cues from 
partisan elites regarding free speech, where one was more receptive to the message when it came 
from a co-partisan. In contemporary politics, we observe students who reject certain guest 
speakers for their ideological positions as they are simultaneously chastised by elite partisans of 
their own party for their lack of openness to ideas. Such behavior shows that college students 
may be more affectively polarized in practice than they are in theory.  
In the following chapter, I will ask Bucknell students questions that hit on similar themes 
as the above survey data. My qualitative research will attempt to find consistent themes from 
student opinions on contemporary politics at the national level and on college campuses. 
Through this inquiry, I will see how prominent an issue political discourse is on college 
campuses. Furthermore, I will try to uncover whether the divisions observed in my quantitative 
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data are a result of mass divisions among students or deep disagreements between the most vocal 






















Chapter 4: Qualitative Research  
Section 4.1: Overview 
Since my thesis was inspired by affective polarization I have both observed and 
experienced during my time at Bucknell, one of the ultimate goals of this project has been to 
discover more about University students’ attitudes towards national politics as well as political 
discourse on campus. To this point, my thesis has reviewed the powerful impacts that affective 
polarization can have on citizens in both political and apolitical aspects of their lives. It has also 
observed nationally representative surveys of college students’ opinions on a variety of topics 
including free speech, guest speakers, and other important issues on campus. In addition to 
providing a window into what Bucknell students think, my qualitative research seeks to find  
matches and discrepancies between themes from the surveys in Chapter 3 and student opinions 
gathered from interviews.  
Overall, these interviews revealed that affective polarization was prominent in some areas 
of student’s lives, but not others. Many students tended to either socialize mainly with peers of 
the same ideology or to keep political conversations to a minimum. However, some did express 
worry about revealing their ideology to friends or having a political argument get out of hand. 
Some subjects also noted that while Bucknell had a mostly welcoming environment for both 
ends of the political spectrum, a vocal minority detracted from this setup. While some 
participants added unique perspectives to my research on polarization, I was generally surprised 
by others’ lack of attention or strong opinions on contemporary politics.  
 In the fall, I received approval from Bucknell’s Institutional Review Board to conduct my 
qualitative research in this manner. Interview participants consisted of members of Professor 
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Ellis’ POLS 140 class, friends from my fraternity, and students from more vocal political groups 
on campus. The POLS 140 students received extra credit for participating in these interviews. 
For students outside of the class, I reached out personally to student leaders from what are 
generally considered the more vocal groups on campus. This included students involved in 
Bucknell Student Government, ​The Bucknellian​, and the Bucknell Program for American 
Leadership and Citizenship. I conducted interviews with 27 students in total. Most interviews 
were conducted in study rooms in Academic West, though a few were conducted in private 
settings at MacDonald Commons. 
Although these interviews played an instrumental role in my research, I recognize that 
Bucknell students are not representative of college students in general. A plurality of students 
hail from affluent suburbs, and while different ideologies dominate across these areas, many 
students are affected by this part of their political socialization. As a private institution, Bucknell 
also attracts a different demographic of students than public universities, community colleges, or 
vocational schools. Moreover, I interviewed only three students of color, including one 
international student. Though Bucknell might not have a sizable minority presence within its 
student body, it’s important to note that this demographic was not fully represented in my 
sample. I’m not sure how a larger sample of this demographic would reflect affective 
polarization, but it’s likely that this would have led to a more left-leaning pool of interviewees. 
In addition, I deliberately interviewed some students (from outside of Professor Ellis’ class) 
specifically to gain an understanding of what the most politically engaged or passionate students 
think. Evidently, they do not represent the average level of political consciousness of the student 
body. 
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I recognize that many students might not be as informed on political issues, or simply do 
not care as much as these interviewees. Moreover, some participants from the POLS 140 class 
also might represent a more informed demographic of the student body because of their 
enrollment in an introductory political science course. On the contrary, a few of these students 
explained to me that they were taking this class in order to gain a better understanding of 
American politics, not because they were already informed. Nevertheless, even a student taking 
such a course without much knowledge of or interest in politics is probably more informed on 
political issues than a student with a similar disinterest but a different academic focus. 
 
Section 4.2 Questions Asked  
At the start of each conversation, I introduced myself as a senior writing an honors thesis 
on polarization on college campuses. I explained that part of my research involved looking at 
national survey data of college students and the other main component was to interview Bucknell 
students to see how what they think relates to that data. It’s possible that this context might have 
primed students in a way that impacted answers to my first question, but I viewed informing 
them as a necessary step in transparency. I would then ask students to sign an Informed Consent 
Form from the University’s Institutional Review Board, noting that I would be recording our 
conversation but that I would not be using the students’ names when referencing their thoughts 
and opinions in my thesis.  
Each interview began with a question on what the participant thought of the current 
political climate. If hesitant to answer at first, students were primed on issues such as 
impeachment, the State of the Union address, and the presidential primaries. I started with this 
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question as a means of warming students up for later answers as well as to implicitly gage their 
level of interest in political issues. In some cases, students’ answers led naturally to my next two 
questions. The first asked where the student would place themselves on the ideological spectrum 
and if they supported one of the two major political parties. The second asked what the 
participant thought of Donald Trump’s presidency so far. While the latter question served to 
contextualize the student’s political beliefs and act as a de facto feeling thermometer, the former 
helped prompt later ideological questions.  
For the first few interviews, I followed up by asking whether the student thought political 
conversations and the political climate in general have changed since the 2016 election. 
However, it became apparent that most of the underclassmen interviewed (who were sophomores 
or juniors in high school at the time) were not as politically conscious at the time as those who 
were of voting age. Subsequently, I saved this question only for students who were of voting age 
during the last presidential campaign. Another question I used initially but gradually withdrew 
unless a student exhibited particularly forceful beliefs dealt with feelings of the opposing party’s 
politicians or supporters. Though a handful of participants had strong negative perceptions of 
outgroup partisans’ behavior in Washington, the majority did not demonstrate signs of affective 
polarization with regards to national politics. It’s unclear whether this was because of genuine 
indifference, lack of attention to the details of the current political climate, or fear of the social 
consequences that could arise from a strong opinion in either direction. 
After gathering these initial readings on a student’s political beliefs, I asked whether they 
thought Bucknell’s student body leans more liberal, more conservative, or somewhere in the 
middle. I then asked students to explain how their party or ideological identity affected dialogues 
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on campus. This set of questions would begin by investigating if participants had friends whom 
they knew supported the opposing party (or ideology). For students with friends who leaned the 
other way, I asked if they discussed politics with those friends and about the nature of those 
conversations. For those who did not have close relationships with outgroup partisans, I asked 
how their opinion of a friend might change if they learned they were a member of the outgroup. 
These questions were the most crucial for my research, as I aimed to learn more about how 
students approach political discussions with members of the opposing party and if students shied 
away from such difficult conversations. 
Following this line of questioning, I asked participants about self-censorship. 
Specifically, I tried to see how students would or would not respond to an opposing viewpoint in 
various social settings. I deliberately left this question open-ended so that students would bring 
up the experiences that were most salient for them. Some participants elaborated on the 
likelihood of them sharing their political opinions within their friend group, while others touched 
on how hearing an opposing viewpoint in class or club meetings affected their decision to 
respond. Next, I asked for students’ thoughts about the importance of hearing opposing 
viewpoints on college campuses- a question which sometimes invited follow-ups and other times 
ended with generic responses on the issue. 
I would begin the final series of questions by asking if the participant thought that 
Bucknell had a welcoming environment for both ends of the ideological spectrum. If the 
respondent focused solely on in-class environments, I would ask them whether they thought their 
answer applied to the overall campus climate. Regardless of the participant’s initial answer, I 
would ask them what steps the University could take (leaving the University to be interpreted as 
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the Bucknell administration, its student body, or some combination of the two) to promote a 
more welcoming environment.  
When interviewees responded with particularly unique perspectives, I follow up with 
improvised questions to collect a more detailed opinion. Likewise, I frequently added follow-ups 
to questions throughout the interview when I thought it was appropriate. Additional questions 
were generally used either to better understand a student’s response or to encourage a student to 
elaborate on a shorter answer. While doing so for the latter situation usually did not provide 
more sophisticated results, these follow-ups were revealing in that they suggested a student’s 
indifference or lack of information on the topic Ultimately, deviating from the script was a 
necessary tool for making the most of each interview. 
 
Section 4.3 Identifying Factors   
Given the caveat that the sample of students interviewed might not necessarily be 
representative of Bucknell’s student body as a whole, it’s important to contextualize their 
political beliefs. The Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP) at the Higher Education 
Research Institute at UCLA conducted a panel study of the Class of 2019 at Bucknell and other 
private non-profit institutions. When surveyed during their freshman year, 37% of Bucknell 
students identified as liberal, another 37% identified as “middle-of-the-road,” and 21% identified 
as conservative. These results are noticeably more conservative than at other selective private 
non-sectarian universities. The comparison group reported as being 6 percentage points more 
liberal, 4 percentage points less moderate, and 8 percentage points less conservative (CIRP 
2016).  
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When surveyed again prior to graduation, almost half (45%) of Bucknell students 
identified as liberal, one-third (34%) identified as middle-of-the-road, and 13% identified as 
conservative. The comparison group for the Class of 2019 at similar institutions identified as 5 
percentage points more liberal, 8 percentage points less moderate, and 5 percentage points less 
conservative (CIRP 2019). Both the first-year and senior year results demonstrate that while 
Bucknell’s student body leans liberal, it does so to a much lesser extent than comparable elite 
universities. Furthermore, a higher proportion of Bucknell students hold conservative political 
views throughout their four years than at similar universities.   10
To an extent, my interviews reflect these ideological differences. Of the 27 students 
interviewed, there was a roughly 50-50 split between liberals and conservatives. Some 
participants represented other ideologies not captured in the CIRP survey; two students identified 
as being squarely in the middle-of-the-road and two identified as libertarian. Other students 
identified as moderates as well, but when pressed they admitted to leaning more towards a 
particular party.  
Likewise, there were some discrepancies when a student may have identified as a liberal 
but not a Democrat, or a conservative but not a Republican. My best guess is that the students 
who identified more with their ideological convictions than a party affiliation felt a disconnect 
10 ​The increase in Bucknell students who identified as liberal over their four years is the same as that of the 
comparison group (roughly 7 percentage points). Meanwhile, Bucknell exhibited a greater decrease in the proportion 
of students holding conservative views than the comparison group and a lower decrease in the proportion of 
middle-of-the-road students. It’s important to note these swings in a liberal direction at Bucknell and beyond, which 
might hint at some form of liberal indoctrination, perhaps caused by the faculty or administration. However, the 
timing of the survey might also have played a key role in these changes. The polarizing nature of the Trump 
presidency (which began after the Class of 2019 took the first-year survey) may have challenged conservative 
students’ beliefs or moved moderate students in a more liberal direction. There are important implications for both 
this potential indoctrination and the Trump presidency on student ideology, but it would be difficult to separate out 
these variables. For this reason, I focus more on the absolute proportions than on the significance behind changes in 
ideology. 
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with the actions and policies of that party. I think these students have an easier time interpreting 
politics through the lens of ideology, and do not (at least from what I observed) exhibit a 
“conflicted” ideology- where one symbolically identifies with one ideology but in practice 
prefers policies that closer align with the other ideology’s modus operandi (Ellis and Stimson 
2012). On the left, this preference for ideology over party might help explain some of Bernie 
Sanders’ appeal with younger voters.  
The moderate or Independent identifying students complicated some of the outgroup 
questions I prepared, though most ultimately provided valuable responses. Whether a student 
identified more with an ideology or a party, they felt comfortable for the purposes of this 
interview to say that they did not support the opposing ideology or party. For libertarian students, 
I asked questions referring to Democrats and liberals as the outgroup. For the moderate students, 
I asked questions focusing on the extremes of both the left and the right. 
Participants had difficulty coming to a consensus about the overall ideology of 
Bucknell’s student body. “Compared to the rest of the nation we’re probably liberal, but 
compared to most like [sic] undergraduate institutions we’re probably more conservative,” a 
senior participant said. “Before coming here I thought it was more conservative. That’s just the 
general feel I got or from people I spoke with, but I think it leans more towards the left,” a 
sophomore said. Meanwhile, another participant said “I think it leans more conservative. That’s 
just based off my friends though. I’m also a freshman, so I don’t know, it’s hard to tell.” As seen 
above, students arrived at a wide variety of conclusions about our ideological makeup. Roughly 
the same number of participants said Bucknell students lean to the left as those who said they 
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lean to the right. Others expressed an ideological imbalance between the faculty or 
administration and the student body.  
Despite the varying opinions, the common theme across answers matched with the CIRP 
data; Bucknell leans more conservative than other selective universities, but many of its students 
(whether because of true preferences or general apathy) identify as middle-of-the-road. Students 
were quick to point out schools such as Middlebury, Williams, and Wesleyan as 
counterexamples where the student body was either more politically active or more vocally 
liberal. Though this general analysis confirms what I have found quantitatively about Bucknell 
students, their responses on important issues (both in national and campus politics) provide a 
clearer picture. 
 
Section 4.4 Attitudes Regarding National Political Landscape 
While prompting students about President Trump produced some variety of answers, 
most did not express significant negative attitudes towards outgroup partisan politicians. In both 
cases, responses were quite revealing about levels of affective polarization among Bucknell 
students. This section will begin by reviewing student attitudes on President Trump. It will then 
pivot to those attitudes, or lack thereof, directed at other salient political issues.  
The majority of participants offered similar responses about their feelings on President 
Trump, regardless of their own ideology. Such responses were almost robotic in their uniformity 
as interviewees continually prefaced their thoughts by saying “he’s been very good for the 
economy,” as one first-year did. From there, participants tailed off in different directions. Some 
noted how they agreed with his agenda but not his personal behavior. Participants also pointed to 
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weaknesses in foreign policy or other character traits as qualifications, but tended to note the 
state of the economy first. Most liberals gave stronger responses, with one student calling 
Trump’s presidency a “disaster” and another saying the president was “incompetent and fairly 
moronic.” Still, even one of the more liberal students interviewed conceded that “if anything, it’s 
benefited [my family] because of the tax cuts.” Ultimately, a number of interviewees did express 
some form of affective polarization against Trump. Liberals demonstrated significant resentment 
and even a few conservative students expressed frustration with Trump’s rhetoric or personal 
conduct. Nevertheless, I was surprised at how frequently students qualified these emotional 
responses by referring to the strong economy. It’s possible that interviewees on both ends of the 
ideological spectrum gave such answers because they were unsure of their interviewer’s politics,
 but I think this response stems more from an environment that conditions them towards a 11
“neither-here-nor-there” response.  
This indecision about the president trended more towards indifference or lack of 
knowledge about the American political scene at large. When asked what he or she thought about 
the current political climate, a majority of students gave default answers that began with “I think 
things are definitely really polarized.” To an extent, I should have expected such responses. After 
all, students were implicitly primed to talk about polarization when I had explained to them the 
nature of my research. One first-year student said “I don’t pay a ton of attention on the news, but 
I feel like it’s [the political climate] obviously really controversial,” representative of a few 
conversations with POLS 140 students who were either taking the class to learn more about 
American politics or were just generally uninformed. Despite those instances, other students 
11 ​I neither revealed nor hinted at my beliefs to interviewees, though some friends interviewed were already aware of 
my personal politics. 
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gave far more nuanced takes on the political climate. These opinions ranged from critiques of the 
media and Nancy Pelosi (for tearing up a copy of Trump’s State of the Union address) to 
comments on the “dehumanization” and personality based brands of politics observed in the 
nation’s capital. In practice, this question served as a “warm up” to prepare students for more 
in-depth responses later in the interview. 
Across the board, most participants did not display noticeably strong feelings against the 
opposing party’s agenda or members of Congress. I had expected that students who held strong 
opinions about President Trump or the Democratic primary campaigns would also have a lot to 
say about figures like Nancy Pelosi and Mitch McConnell or the impeachment proceedings. Two 
liberal students did provide forceful rejections of McConnell, but for the most part subjects 
lamented the prevalence of both inter-party and intra-party conflict rather than expressing serious 
resentment towards individual politicians. More vocal students provided stronger responses, such 
as “I would hate or dislike Republicans less if they did things constructively that believe in” or 
“I feel like the administration is… very obvious with their political beliefs and I feel like they 
tend to support one side [referring to liberals] more than the other when it comes to having 
speakers on campus.” Given that a noticeable portion of the POLS 140 students interviewed 
didn’t indicate much loyalty to a particular party (due to identifying as an Independent who 
leaned in a particular direction or as a libertarian), perhaps I should have expected to receive a lot 
of lukewarm responses.  
Maybe the affective polarization observed by Zimmerman (2016) only occurs at the elite 
level. This would not be Fiorina’s real political elites, but would instead refer to the most vocal 
(and likely most polarized) students on campus who might hail from groups with particularly 
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amplified voices, such as student government, media, and political activism groups. Though 
these students tended to have the most information about political issues, they were not alone in 
expressing strong opinions as they related to political discourse among students. College “elites” 
may be especially polarized, but other participants expressed similarly strong opinions when the 
discussion shifted away from the national scene and towards campus politics.  
 
Section 4.5 Conversations on Campus  
The students I interviewed can be more or less divided into three categories regarding 
political conversations. The first group included students whose friend groups consisted solely of 
people with similar ideological beliefs. The second group included participants with friends who 
held different ideological beliefs from their own, but who were willing to engage in political 
discussions with these friends (at least to a certain extent). The third group consisted of students 
who, like the previous group, had friends on the other end of the political spectrum. Members of 
this group, for varying reasons, would not talk politics with those friends.  
In practice, most of the first group was composed of students who did not associate with 
outgroup partisans because of genuine disagreements. “I think it’s difficult because we have like 
a different idea of what the country’s goals should be and different values,” a first-year student 
said. One liberal sophomore student echoed this sentiment but in different terms. She did not 
have any outwardly conservatives friends, but offered a distinction between “if [a friend] was 
just a general Republican- because my family is half Republican and half Democrats” and the 
“morality” of someone who is a “big Donald Trump supporter.” In line with this reasoning, 
Bucknell seniors- who voted in the 2016 election during their freshman fall- pointed to Trump’s 
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election and its aftermath as a critical juncture in campus politics. A moderate senior thought 
there had been a “common consensus that Hillary was going to win in 2016” in tandem with 
“more silent support for Trump.” Before the election, he observed that campus talks and speakers 
were more based more on facts than opinions, while events since then have focused on more 
divisive issues. A conservative senior agreed that Trump has changed the landscape of political 
conversations, but that such divisions were brewing earlier. “I feel like the eight years under 
Obama there was kind of like a false sense of consensus that Democrats thought he was the 
greatest thing and Republicans didn’t. And those differences never really had to meet each other- 
to a great extent- until 2016,” he said.  
It’s possible that Trump is the inflection point for campus affective polarization, but it’s 
unclear if liberal students who did not mention him when talking about Republicans were more 
influenced more by ire against Trump, the Republican agenda, or actual on-campus politics. One 
liberal junior said that she has tried and failed to get along with people from the other side of the 
aisle. “I think that part of the reason that I am not close with people, especially those who are 
really right-leaning, is because when we talk politics it makes us angry. And we don’t get along 
and we realize we don’t really want to be friends,” she said. From this conversation, for instance, 
it was difficult to attribute the participant’s negative feelings towards outgroup partisans to any 
one specific element.  
While strong opinions dictated most of the first group’s social circumstances, a few 
students noted that they had surrounded themselves with co-partisans by coincidence. One 
conservative freshman said that she did not have any liberal friends, yet this was not by design. 
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“I guess in my day-to-day life politics doesn’t really come up, like you can kind of stray away 
from talking about politics,” she said. Another conservative student said that he had a few 
acquaintances who “if I were to guess maybe I’d say they’re Democrats,” but the majority of 
people he interacted with were conservatives (this participant was an engineering student who 
was taking POLS 140 as an elective class). My conversation with him also suggested that politics 
just does not come up frequently in many areas of a Bucknell education. Overall, these 
conversations (as well as the one from the above paragraph) reflected trends occurring at the 
national level: Some Americans express hostility towards outgroup partisans, while others 
simply resent how polarizing politics (and those who are intensely passionate about it) can be. 
Participants who fell into the second category I described shared similar thoughts as those 
in the first one. These students reported being more open in the past to discussing politics with 
friends from the other end of the political spectrum, but had since been turned off from it. This 
dissuasion came from multiple angles. One student who identified as a libertarian said that “it’s 
frustrating” talking to a liberal friend. Though these discussions never get “heated,” as he 
described it, he and the friend would often talk past each other and failed to see common ground.  
In similar fashion, a moderate first-year said that when he and his conservative roommate 
do try to talk politics, they “don’t make up any ground on each other.” Likewise, a liberal 
first-year student said that trying to engage in political discussions with her conservative friends 
was “kind of pointless because nothing they say is going to make me Republican and nothing I 
say is going to make them a Democrat.” It’s possible that some of this student’s hesitance to 
converse with the other side, like those from the first group, stemmed from attitudes about the 
current administration. Of her conservative friends, she said “I don’t love that they are [Trump 
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supporters], but I wouldn’t completely cut them off.” Whether or not a student would look at 
someone differently upon learning their political leanings, the fear of such repercussions 
resonated with at least one interviewee. This conservative sophomore noted that if she were to 
discuss politics with her Democratic friends, it would be in more factual terms, such as an event 
in the presidential race. She said that after discussing her opinions with acquaintances she “felt 
like there was sort of a wall that went up after that… I felt like once I expressed my opinion they 
sort of maybe looked at me differently or viewed my other thoughts on things a little different 
[sic].” Among the hours I spent conducting these interviews, this quote might have been the one 
that best encapsulated how affective polarization manifests on campus. This is the Republican 
Alabama fan who prefers to sit next to an Auburn fan than a Democrat (Engelhardt and Utych 
2018), or the Democrat who would find someone less attractive for supporting Mitt Romney 
(Nicholson et. al 2016). While these repercussions might not be on every student’s mind, this 
student’s story exemplifies the tangible impact that affective polarization can have on campus. 
The third group of students provided hope for both the importance of political discourse 
on college campuses and the potential for respect between disagreeing parties. One participant 
who described himself as slightly left of center lamented that his friends on both ends of the 
political spectrum sometimes struggle to listen to each other and “ignore facts.” However, he 
also reported that these conversations can be rewarding and that he and his friends may leave 
them with a better understanding of each other’s beliefs. “After a while I think you can find 
common ground. You know, once you both present your side and you actually show them what 
you mean.”  
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A conservative student emphasized civility as a key ingredient for having productive 
political conversations. In fact, he said that under certain conditions it’s easy to discuss such 
issues with his liberal friends:  
“All you need to do is… I think political conversations should start with a 
declaration of ends. And like 95 percent of the time those ends will line up. 
And so you start with this basis of understanding, or of agreement, from then 
forth you can get into your actual disagreement which is over the means. Just 
if you… if you make the other person understand that you’re not a bad person, 
or you’re not the caricature that like they think of when they think of the 
opposing party, then they’re [the conversations] easy to have.” 
 
This statement ties back to my example in Chapter 1- when President Trump claimed that a 
group of politicians “hated” the United States. Evidently, it seems rather dubious at that level 
that someone who truly hates the country would run for public office and work as a public 
servant. As this participant sees it, these politicians (as well as Bucknell students) share the same 
goals for the country; they just happen to disagree on how the “means” for accomplishing such 
goals.  
Of course, it’s easier said than done for a student- especially one who leans strongly to 
the left or right- to believe that outgroup partisans seek similar ends as their own. In addition, the 
controversial nature of Trump’s presidency might make it understandably difficult for liberal 
students to even consider hearing out conservative perspectives. At the same time, there is reason 
to suspect that plenty of students do view those of the opposing party as the “caricatures” 
described above. Maybe Bucknell students let these preconceived notions influence their 
interactions, in turn leading to more dysfunction and an inherent distrust or resentment towards 
outgroup members. Though some aspects of my research questions were personal, they do not 
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fully uncover what plays into a student’s perception of the opposing party past inferences 
deduced from their responses and their political socialization.  
One conservative first-year proposed the value of having political debates with her 
roommate. “If we both have very strong opinions, it’s not really going to change their mind, but 
it might open their eyes to understand the other side.” Opening one’s eyes to a different 
perspective captures the sentiment of the “declaration of ends” described by the previous student. 
For this participant, there is inherent value in having cross-aisle conversations for both students 
involved. Not only does a student receive the context of another perspective, such conversations 
can also “in a way strengthened my own views because I was forced to explain them to someone 
else,” the first-year said. Although starting these conversations might be difficult, the possibility 
of clarifying and strengthening one’s own values appears to be a tangible benefit for all parties 
involved. Even one Democratic student who did not have Republican friends emphasized the 
need for backing up opinions with evidence and exposing them to scrutiny. Despite the 
potentially unsettling thought of debating those with whom one has deep disagreements, it seems 
that these conversations can truly benefit students regardless of whether they find common 
ground. At the least, students might avoid groupthink or echo chambers. At best, a student might 
walk away from these situations knowing how to better articulate their beliefs. Both of these 
benefits essentially describe the goal of liberal arts institutions: to develop critical thinking skills. 
One final interesting perspective from the third group came from an independent student 
who leans Democratic. After she had told me that she has friends who lean more conservative, I 
asked her if she ever talks politics with them. Without missing a beat, the student said, “I do, and 
I kind of regret it because it’s like talking to a wall.” In spite of the apparent immovability of 
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some of her friends, she suggested that gender might play into how we express political opinions. 
When having conversations with female friends, she thought that even friends with whom she 
disagreed could find common ground or at least respect each other’s perspective. In contrast, the 
majority of Bucknell males she had spoken with were conservative and unyielding in their 
opinion. According to her, these males would be adamant and borderline arrogant in upholding 
their own beliefs and rejecting hers, yet they demanded their opinion be respected.  
I would hesitate to say this instance is anything close to representative of political 
expression at Bucknell. The CIRP first-year survey of Bucknell students reported that 
approximately one-third (31%) of the Class of 2019 males were conservative. This figure is 
higher than the percentage of the class overall (21%) and female students (16%), as well as the 
proportion of conservative first-year males at comparable private, nonsectarian colleges (19%). 
In relative terms, these numbers appear significant, but in absolute terms two-thirds of the Class 
of 2019’s males still did not identify as conservative. While one academic study found that men 
were more likely than women to exhibit confidence in defending their political opinions 
(Albarracín, Wang, and Albarracín 2012), I would reject that as a sufficient explanation for the 
behavior the participant describes. Since I cannot show any overarching data on Bucknell male 
students (or college-aged males in general) being more steadfast in their beliefs, I will maintain 
that this is a useful example, but not a representative one. 
By breaking down interviewees into different (yet interrelated) groups, we see that 
Bucknell students appear divided by those who are willing to engage in political discussions with 
outgroup partisans and those who are not. Some of these students have attempted to talk politics 
across the aisle and have since renounced it, while others feel there is either room for common 
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ground or value in hearing opposing perspectives. These discussions lead to my next section, 
regarding the campus environment for varying political beliefs. 
 
Section 4.6 Beliefs on Campus: What Is and Is Not Welcomed 
Despite a wide variety of student perceptions on campus ideology and a consensus 
around the importance of hearing opposing viewpoints, many interviewees shared a sense that 
some political ideas were not welcomed at the University. This included overall political 
discussion as well as concrete examples of guest speakers who were invited to campus. For the 
most part, participants expressed that the ideas that were not welcomed came from the 
conservative end of the spectrum, as liberal ideas enjoyed more leeway. Some students thought 
that Bucknell allows for both ends of the political spectrum to be heard, though others, especially 
those more informed on campus events and politics, disagreed with this notion.  
My interviews painted a clear picture that students felt campus was not as receptive to 
ideas coming from the political right. “I think there’s more backlash towards conservative 
speakers,” one student said, pointing to the most visible evidence of this divide. For students who 
mentioned guest speakers, the most notable events came were two guest speakers who visited 
Bucknell during the fall 2019 semester. In September, liberal historian Mark Bray visited 
campus to discuss his book ​Antifa: The Anti-fascist Handbook​. His visit generated minimal 
reactions from the campus community, aside from a letter to the editor in the student newspaper. 
In November, conservative political commentator Heather Mac Donald spoke about her recent 
publication, ​The Diversity Delusion: How Race and Gender Pandering Corrupt the University 
and Undermine Our Culture​. In contrast to Bray’s visit, Mac Donald’s talk incited controversy 
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and even condemnation among some members of the student body. Students from the 
University’s Democratic Socialists club organized a peaceful protest across the street from the 
venue of the Mac Donald talk. Meanwhile, the campus sexual assault prevention organization 
held an alternative event in response to Mac Donald’s talk. Simply stated, though Bray’s visit 
barely registered on students’ radars, Mac Donald’s event produced shockwaves   12
Right-leaning students pointed to the disparity in reactions to these two speakers as a sign 
that certain perspectives were not fully welcomed at Bucknell. One student described the 
reaction to Mac Donald’s visit as “an attack on the conservative side of things.” Another 
conservative student thought how liberal students responded to each event was hypocritical. “We 
didn’t protest Mark Bray when he came. We went and listened to him talk. We didn’t have any 
protest outside,” she said. Similarly, an additional conservative student noted that “conservatives 
usually get a bad rap” on campus and said that such protests are “limiting your education and 
limiting what you’re exposed to.”  
Though the prevailing consensus among participants suggested a bias against 
conservatives, one student contended that far left perspectives faced similar challenges on 
campus. “I’ve seen other students who identify as socialist or communist or anarchist be like 
mocked by administrators, professors, students,” he said. While this participant noted that these 
perspectives were still legally welcomed at the University, he thought that the majority of the 
campus community was not receptive to such ideas. This student attributed such attitudes to 
overwhelming capitalist beliefs among students on both the left and right. According to him, the 
12 ​In fact, after Mac Donald’s visit to Bucknell, she penned an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal titled “Why Are 
College Students So Afraid of Me?” In the article, she describes the reception she was met with at Bucknell as well 
as a recent event at College of the Holy Cross. While the Holy Cross students seem to have demonstrated more 
antagonistic behavior and the article is an opinion piece, it does provide interesting insight into the University’s 
environment for conservative speakers. 
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middle 85-90% of Bucknell students fall into this category. Perspectives to the left or right of 
this group were either not welcome or not taken seriously. Ultimately, this student agreed that all 
political perspectives expressed at Bucknell should be subject to scrutiny; however, he took issue 
with “preemptive” scrutiny in which a student may be viewed as “radical” before explaining the 
logic behind their stance. Of course, this perspective is not fully representative of student 
opinions. Still, it’s important to recognize that radical views on the left might feel just as 
unwelcome as conservative (though not necessarily radical) views on the right. 
Other students made more specified arguments about how welcoming Bucknell is for 
political debate and what issues are most important. For instance, one first-year student said that 
“especially on a college campus, the social issues are definitely bigger than economic issues in 
[terms of] range of importance to you.” If true, such priorities help explain why Heather Mac 
Donald’s visit warranted such an intense reaction. Mac Donald writes on social issues relating to 
race and gender, as well as college pedagogy, so it makes sense why her appearance fostered 
resentment among some students. However, my research has indicated that social issues, even if 
they are more salient to certain students, do not define the boundaries of campus political 
discussion. After all, Rutgers did not reject Condoleezza Rice’s potential commencement speech 
for her positions on social issues, they did so for her foreign policy decisions (Fitzsimmons 
2014). Likewise, many of the liberal students I spoke with emphasized the need for government 
to address economic inequality- sometimes in relation to President Trump’s job performance, 
other times referring to general political issues. These conversations suggest that a rejection of 
conservative viewpoints is not exclusive to a particular issue area.  
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Even though this bias may dissuade certain political expression at Bucknell, most 
participants lamented how certain ideas do not seem not welcome. “It is, I think, intrinsically 
valuable to have people from the other side to talk to,” one senior said. Other students echoed 
this sentiment, noting the importance of having discussions despite the campus’ apparent 
inability to actually engage in them. In the same vein, some complained about those who were 
unwilling to engage with alternative perspectives or only listen to opinions for the sake of 
“confirmation bias.” Furthermore, participants argued that part of the problem with welcoming 
different viewpoints at the University stems from peers assuming the extreme about them. 
“When I say I lean more towards a liberal point of view, they expect that I’m like an extreme 
liberal, which isn’t necessarily true,” one first-year said. “Because of the political environment I 
feel like everyone just kind of assumes the worst almost.” This statement captures fears of both 
Bucknell’s left and right: the fear of ostracism or other negative consequences from sharing 
certain perspectives. 
Moreover, it’s possible that the politically active on campus have also created a gulf 
between them and those who do not care about politics. “I think in today’s day and age, there’s 
less and less people that are apolitical,” one conservative student said. “And I think you hear a 
lot of things coming out of the left saying like, ‘if you’re apolitical, that’s bad.’” Though it’s 
unclear whether being apolitical is a left versus right issue as this student argued, we can see how 
this statement carries similar themes to the first-year mentioned in the previous paragraph. That 
student describes people assuming the worst about those who are political, while this 
conservative student points out how people also do so for those who are not political at all. Is the 
latter truly a manifestation of affective polarization? In short, it is not, but the prevalence of 
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apolitical attitudes sheds light on what seems to be the biggest source of division at Bucknell and 
perhaps at other colleges too. 
 
Section 4.7 Who Cares? 
Rather than causing division in itself, apolitical students represent only a segment of the 
student body. In fact, those who seem apolitical may not actually hold such indifference towards 
political issues. My interviews conveyed the presence of four categories of students at Bucknell 
with respect to their political expression. The first group is a small subset of students who are 
exceptionally vocal about their political opinions. Most of these students appear to hail from the 
left, although this definition encompasses both ends of Bucknell’s ideological spectrum. The 
second group includes students who are politically engaged but are scared to speak. These are the 
students who, like some of my interviewees, took a great deal of interest in politics but felt like 
they were “walking on eggshells” or that people would “assume the extreme” about their 
positions. The third group, relatively similar to the second one, consists of students who are 
disgusted by the behavior of the vocal students and tend to lie more towards the middle of the 
ideological spectrum. The fourth group is students who are legitimately apolitical. I failed to 
come across such students in my interviews because of the selection bias involved in using a 
political science class for the majority of my participants. Obviously, an apolitical student is 
unlikely to enroll in “Introduction to American Politics.” At the same time, it’s worth 
recognizing that these students do not necessarily ignore American politics, they just do not have 
strong opinions about its issues or outcomes.  
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Referring to this last group, one participant noted that many Bucknell students are 
apathetic about political issues. “A lot of people don’t care what their friends’ political views are. 
Compared to other schools that I’ve seen, people here really don’t care about politics as much,” 
she said. Other participants reiterated this perspective. “I think there’s a large amount of students 
that are not really loyal to one party or another. They’re kind of in the middle or they don’t really 
have a political opinion,” a conservative first-year said. “That’s been the case with at least half of 
my friends that I’ve talked to- they aren’t really involved in politics.” Evidently, politics are not 
on the forefront of many members of the campus community.The former student also provided a 
description of the vocal subset of Bucknell students, saying that “I think there’s a small group… 
of people on campus who are politically active and who kind of are separate from the majority of 
campus, or not separate but distanced from the majority of campus.” This majority might not 
describe the same 85-90% between the extremes as a previously mentioned participant had said, 
though it does accurately represent the latter three groups of students. 
Where does this apathy come from? Interviewees who brought up the indifference of 
their peers pointed mainly to demographics and the “Bucknell bubble” as reasons for such 
behavior. “It seems like Bucknellians are just in general more apathetic, and that might be 
because we’re sort of on this fast track where we’re going to get where we’re going to go 
regardless,” one sophomore participant said. This “fast track” refers to the upper middle class 
backgrounds of a plurality of students. Multiple interviewees said that the socioeconomic status 
of many Bucknell students leads to their inattention to politics. These participants implied that 
because these students do not stand to lose significantly in the current political system, they feel 
comfortable with adhering to an apolitical lifestyle. Students had mixed reactions as to whether 
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this was a net positive or negative for the campus. For example, one liberal participant said that 
“If I was really into activism, I don’t know if I’d go here.” This was not to say that the student 
was upset with a lack of activism on campus, but seemed to indicate that those seeking such an 
environment might be disappointed at Bucknell.  
Whether or not activism is prevalent at Bucknell, many interviewees brought up the 
aforementioned vocal minority of Bucknell students. Participants noted that this group drives the 
majority of the activism that exists on campus, as well as much of the political conversation. 
“The majority isn’t very loud. You have a smaller group that’s just louder… that leans more 
left,” one first-year student said. Another student hit on this theme, saying a vocal minority of 
liberals at Bucknell “is like 5% of the population, if that… I think there’s a big silent majority 
that is conservative.”  
My interviewees proposed varying implications from this subset of students. Many 
contended that the vocal minority created an impression that the student body leaned more left 
than it actually did. They also suggested that the campus left is more expressive than others by 
nature, creating situations where their perspectives appear more welcome and amplified. Others 
noted the impact that the vocal minority had on other groups of students. For instance, one liberal 
first-year offered that politically active conservative students might not “want to get into it” with 
the liberal students driving the conversation. A more outspoken conservative student agreed, to 
an extent, with this notion. Though usually eager to share his opinions, this student said that he 
might “back off” in a political debate if he finds himself outnumbered. However, this student 
expressed more worry about the presence of liberal faculty than vocal liberal students with 
regards to any self-censorship.  
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 How Professors Contribute 
At this point, it’s worth briefly exploring the impact of faculty on affective polarization 
on campus.  When describing campus ideology, many interviewees suggested that Bucknell’s 13
professors leaned further left than the student body. According to some, this dynamic can put 
conservative students in difficult situations. “They’re the keepers of your grades,” the 
conservative student from the previous paragraph said. “You’re not going to try to piss off the 
people that are evaluating your performance and ultimately dictating whether or not you’re going 
to be successful in the world.” This power dynamic can lead to conservative students “catering” 
to their professors or being generally “hesitant” to share their opposing viewpoint, as two other 
conservative participants put it. Thus, some students appear more fearful of the negative impacts 
of affective polarization from their professors than from their peers.  
 In spite of these reactions, other students- including conservatives- shared that their 
professors were good at offering opposing perspectives. “I’d say the professors I’ve had have 
done a good job of not favoring one viewpoint,” one Democratic student said. “I think they really 
try… to be bipartisan and not take one side and are always playing devil’s advocate.” Some 
students also emphasized the importance of professors acting in such a manner to moderate 
classroom discussion, as one student noted that “If professors show both sides, or are required to 
even if they do lean one way, it helps educate everyone.” It’s quite possible that conservative 
students were more cognizant of a liberal bias emanating from professors, and were thus more 
likely to bring it up in interviews. Since most participants did not mention professors’ impact on 
13 ​While not directly relevant to my main discussion of affective polarization among students, I felt that a discussion 
of faculty ideology warranted more coverage than a footnote.  
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campus politics (outside of the context of Bucknell’s overall ideology), I find it difficult to reach 
a conclusion on this matter other than that faculty ideology can have tangible effects on student 
participation and performance. 
 
The Middle Ground 
Returning to the earlier discussion, a few participants from the second and third groups I 
mentioned felt boxed out by their most vocal peers. One moderate student noted that he tailored 
his political rhetoric “all the time” to the specific audience. For this student, such behavior 
extended beyond the classroom- where he advocates more to the left- to his internship 
experiences- where he voiced a more conservative tone. Another participant, this one a 
conservative, said that she would be more inclined to express her opinion in an individual, 
private setting. “But if it was in front of a class, I would probably just sit there,” she said. I 
followed up with this student by asking why she would be so hesitant to speak up in class. In 
response, she said “It’s less personal and I guess there’s more people to kind of judge what you 
think. And while there could be a lot of people to support you, there could also be a lot of people 
who, I don’t know, would come at you and maybe make defending yourself a little harder.”  
While this seems like valid reasoning for not wanting to participate, this hesitance seems 
surprising because the same student had said that the student body leans more conservative and 
did not have any vocally liberal friends. Moreover, she noted that politics did not come up in her 
daily life. On the other hand, this student showed pessimism towards her peers’ reactions to 
guest speakers on campus. According to her, guest speakers are somewhat of an exercise in 
futility; she thought that minds would not change from hearing different perspectives, if students 
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even opened themselves up to these viewpoints. Of course, this participant does not speak for all 
of my interviewees nor for the campus at large. Still, by understanding this perspective, we can 
see how those on the right or in the middle of campus ideology may feel crowded out of political 
discussions.  
A flawed explanation for this sentiment would suggest that liberal students are simply 
more steadfast in their convictions. After all, one conservative first-year said that participating in 
political discourse “depends more so how strongly you believe in your views. Because if you 
hear something that strongly contradicts anything that you think, then I believe you’ll have a 
strong feeling to interject.” However, the mere presence of vocal conservatives seems to at least 
partially disprove this notion. What’s more plausible is that the more vocal liberals are more 
involved on campus in politically active groups. A number of conservative and moderate 
students mentioned this prevalence in their interviews. Involvement in such groups amplifies 
these liberal voices, effectively pulling the student body’s ideology more to the left.  I doubt that 14
most members of the more politically involved and active groups intend to create an 
uncomfortable climate for conservative students to voice their opinions.  Nevertheless, it’s easy 15
to see how these groups appear to influence (regardless of whether they do so in practice) the 
climate for speech and affective polarization at Bucknell. In addition to the most vocal groups, 
student perceptions seem to play an enormous role in dictating political conversation. In this 
14 ​As the former Editor-in-Chief of the campus newspaper, I can personally attest to this behavior. I first joined ​The 
Bucknellian​ as an opinions writer and frequent critic of the political climate and the Trump administration. I did so 
as a form of expressing my own opinion rather than projecting it onto others, but I understand how these more 
visible, active groups could have a perceived power to dictate the campus conversation. 
15 ​Though it’s possible that the most extreme students might want to make liberal ideas the new normal and 
conservative ones more taboo.  
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case, conservative and moderate students might perceive an unwelcoming environment even if 
liberal students actually want to listen to and understand opposing viewpoints. 
 
Section 4.8 Conclusion 
Overall, interviewees struggled to come to a consensus regarding the campus’ ideology. 
Across ideologies, students found it difficult to put their finger on the pulse of what their peers 
truly believed, and this uncertainty factored into political discourse at Bucknell. The majority of 
the students I interviewed did not display extreme levels of affective polarization to the point 
where they would not associate with people from the other side of the aisle. However, some 
students did express such concerns and expressed resentment, or at least frustration, with 
outgroup partisans. Participants frequently mentioned a plurality of apathetic students, but it’s 
unclear to what extent this group is truly apathetic as opposed to those who have political 
opinions but do not feel comfortable expressing them. In other words, some of these students 
may have actually felt “neither-here-nor-there” about important issues, but others may just give 
off that impression because they perceive this lack of position as the status quo. Moreover, 
interviewees pointed to a vocal minority that at least seemed to shift campus discourse to the left 
and at most made for an unwelcoming environment for conservative students.  
In the next chapter, I will analyze how my qualitative findings align with my quantitative 
research and literature review. This comparison will bring about conclusions as to how prevalent 
affective polarization is on college campuses and at Bucknell. In general, I find that affective 
polarization is far more prevalent at other campuses and across the country than it is at Bucknell. 
The University’s environment still exemplifies affective polarization, sometimes showing intense 
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divisions, but our campus displays fewer problems than other institutions and America as a 
whole. Moreover, the resentment found at Bucknell is still potent because the setting of a college 
campus magnifies such disagreement. After synthesizing these data, I will end by suggesting the 




















Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Polarization has a clear and tremendous impact on today’s political climate. At the 
national level, we often see gridlock and borderline child-like behavior from our elected officials 
in lieu of political solutions. Though the extent of polarization on the country as a whole is up for 
debate, we can see tangible effects of these intense social divisions on at least part of the general 
public (Mason 2016). In my interviews, I spoke with a number of students who reflected some 
level of disdain towards outgroup partisans. Most of these participants did not overtly express the 
serious affective polarization seen in studies such as Engelhardt and Utych (2018) or McConnell 
et al. (2018). However, they did note their own tendencies to self-censor their political opinions. 
My qualitative findings here align with the FIRE survey data, which found that over half of 
college students self-censored in class. Interview participants from both ends of the ideological 
spectrum admitted to self-censoring. They did so fearful of the social repercussions of saying 
something controversial or against the grain, not just in class but in some interactions with peers 
as well. Again, this agrees with college student survey data that found 48% of respondents feared 
facing judgment for their opinions and 30% thought peers would find their own view “offensive” 
(FIRE 2017). Ultimately, self-censorship stands as a byproduct of affective polarization. Altering 
the opinions one expresses acts as a shield to the negativity and animosity that the current 
political climate would normally project on such ideas. 
On the more extreme end of polarization, partisans may subtly or even blatantly 
dehumanize members of the outgroup (Cassese 2019). However, this may be more of an elite 
phenomenon, as citizens are more likely to simply express negative feelings towards the 
outgroup than to actually describe them in animalistic or mechanistic terms (Martherus et al. 
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2019). My quantitative data suggests that a great deal of the polarization seen on college 
campuses stems from student hypocrisy (especially from the left), rather than the strong 
emotional responses captured in the studies mentioned above. In other words, some students may 
express support for free speech on campus, but continually qualify such remarks when faced 
with controversial speakers or subject matter. For instance, national survey data found that 
three-quarters (75%) of students supported free speech regardless of whether it offends members 
of the community. At the same time, over half (57%) of respondents thought colleges should be 
able to restrict speech found to be “hurtful” or “offensive” (FIRE 2019). I observed this same 
behavior in my student interviews, though not as frequently as I expected. While almost every 
participant was quick to emphasize the importance of viewpoint diversity at Bucknell, only some 
explicitly contradicted their prior opinions in the process. 
My qualitative research suggested the presence of de facto “elites” at Bucknell who were 
dictating the campus’ political conversations. Many students noted how this vocal minority of 
very liberal students created the impression that the campus leans farther to the left than it does 
in reality. Interviewees pointed to some members of this vocal group who protested Heather Mac 
Donald’s visit to Bucknell in November. I would assume that it is this same demographic of 
students who have pushed for the cancellation of guest speakers at other schools, such as 
Condoleezza Rice at Rutgers and Madeleine Albright at Scripps. Nevertheless, it’s important to 
recognize that objection to a guest speaker does not directly correlate with membership in this 
vocal group. For instance, a speaker such as Milo Yiannopoulos or, to a lesser extent, Ben 
Shapiro is more likely to incite a strong response from the student body due to their provocative 
nature. Survey data confirms this notion, as speakers whose remarks may be perceived as 
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“racist” or “hateful” (FIRE 2017). Thus, the vocal minority of students might be in line with 
campus beliefs in some instances but are more likely to protest speakers who the middle 80 
percent- to paraphrase from my interviews- feels are not objectionable.  
To reiterate, this vocal minority of students (at least at Bucknell) is not representative of 
the overall campus ideology. The political landscape at Bucknell leans to the left, but not as far 
to the left as students in this subset do. Many participants were quick to mention how Bucknell’s 
student body was noticeably more conservative than similar liberal arts colleges. Survey data 
confirms that Bucknell students lean more to the right than the student body of other four-year 
private colleges and universities (CIRP 2016). Additionally, students at Bucknell remain more 
conservative over their college careers, experiencing less of a leftward shift in ideology than 
students at peer institutions (CIRP 2019). As a result, it’s possible that the views of the most 
vocal liberal students at Bucknell appear more like outliers than they would at other campuses.  
Another consequence of this dynamic is that Bucknell students demonstrated lower levels 
of affective polarization than I had expected. Some students did not socialize (whether 
intentionally or not) with outgroup partisans, while others did have friends from the other side of 
the aisle but shied away from discussing politics with them. More interview participants said 
either that politics did not come up in conversation with their friends or that ideology was not 
that important of a factor in forming their social circle. With regards to the former, I had 
expected a plurality of students to mention their frustration with outgroup partisan behavior in 
Congress, the White House, or the presidential primaries. Although some students did express 
strong opinions on these actors without being prompted, a larger portion only made general 
remarks about polarization in Washington. It’s possible these measured attitudes stemmed from 
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the sizable number of Bucknell students who identify as “middle-of-the-road,” but other students 
contended that apathy or indifference towards politics was the true explanation. 
Of course, there is a third possible explanation for these attitudes: Perhaps Bucknell 
students simply have a disdain for political issues. After all, research demonstrates that people 
with an aversion to politics may just want to avoid political people, and they express negative 
feelings towards those vocal partisans on both sides of the aisle (Klar et al. 2018). We see more 
evidence of this in that Independents were more likely to agree with a message if delivered by 
their college president (a de facto neutral party) than if it came from either President Obama or 
Vice President Pence (BIPP 2017). Ultimately, I think Bucknell’s student body represents a sum 
of these three pieces. Some students were truly moderates or libertarians who did not fit cleanly 
into one political party or the other. Other students may truly not be that cognizant of everyday 
politics. The students I interviewed represented a more politically informed subgroup, regardless 
of whether they were majoring in political science or had simply taken the course to learn more 
about the subject. Meanwhile, as at least one engineering student told me, a number of students 
do not encounter politics in their day-to-day lives. For some, this is because their courses do not 
concern politics, especially if they fall outside of the humanities or social sciences. For others, 
this is because their social circles do not discuss or are not interested in the topic.  
Students may also appear apathetic because they truly do not care about the issues at 
hand in Washington. A few interviewees were quick to mention the white, upper-middle class 
demographic that makes up a noticeable proportion of Bucknell’s student body. These students 
proposed that since this demographic would likely be unaffected by any major political 
decisions, they had little incentive to care. I did not speak with any students who fit into this 
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description, but I would guess this conjecture does describe some of the University’s student 
population. 
Although my qualitative interviews were revealing, they demonstrated that the 
characteristics of Bucknell’s political climate did not necessarily overlap with national trends of 
polarization with the general public and on college campuses. If I were making a Venn diagram, 
the overlap would consist of self-censoring, liberal bias, and some disdain for outgroup partisans. 
Bucknell then differs from the general college population in terms of overall ideology (leaning 
more to the right than most campuses), student body demographics (trending more towards 
white, upper-middle class), and climate for political discussion. To the last point, Bucknell 
shares other institutions’ problems with fostering civil political discourse due to factors such as 
liberal bias and self-censorship. Still, our campus diverges in that conversations are often 
dominated by a vocal minority of very liberal students, which is comparatively smaller than the 
population of further left ideologies at other colleges. It’s also important to recognize data 
showing that Bucknell’s student body is more moderate and more conservative than comparable 
four-year private colleges (CIRP 2016, 2019). Because of these differences, my data from 
Bucknell should not be interpreted as representative of the general college population. However, 
these interviews are integral for anecdotal evidence and gauging the feelings of the student body- 
and some of these experiences describe behavior on many other campuses. 
 
Vocal Minority: Final Thoughts 
In addition to the students I interviewed from Professor Ellis’ class, I deliberately sought 
out a handful of students who were more outspoken in their beliefs from both sides of the aisle. 
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Though their perspectives were crucial for understanding how “the vocal minority” itself 
interprets the political climate on campus, it’s difficult to say that these individuals represented 
the full scope of this subset. Therein lies a double-edged sword. Giving these students more 
attention would better contextualize their perspectives, but also inflate their true influence on 
campus. On the other hand, not delving further into this subset necessitates conjecture, and 
would have seemed inappropriate considering the frequency with which the vocal minority was 
mentioned in interviews. Though a few of my original interview subjects were strong partisans, I 
felt it was essential to represent the breadth of Bucknell’s ideological spectrum via a few 
students who would be considered part of the most politically vocal on campus.  
Had I shifted more of my focus on these vocal students, I would guess they would show 
the greatest levels of affective polarization. Like a number of other students I heard from, they 
would surely have strong opinions about the Trump administration, but I would expect they also 
have deeper sentiments than their peers about other political actors (such as Mitch McConnell, 
Mike Pence, and Nancy Pelosi). I would also expect that these students would show more 
disdain for their peers of the opposing ideology, rejecting conservatism and not wanting to 
associate with people who- at least openly- subscribe to that ideology.  
I’m less confident in predicting whether a larger sample size of vocal, liberal students 
would tend to self-censor their opinions. Despite their prevalence, these students felt they had far 
from a perceived monopoly on political discourse. In fact, one individual who I interviewed said 
that he felt his “leftist” ideas were more taboo than most conservative ideas. Would other vocal 
students agree? It seems oxymoronic that anyone in this subset would hesitate to express their 
opinion, but I would imagine some of this has to do with how outnumbered that student is in a 
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classroom. The survey data I reviewed found that very liberal students felt about 10% more 
comfortable expressing their opinions (measured by lack of self-censorship) than very 
conservative students; however, a majority (51%) of very liberal students still self-censored 
(FIRE 2017). Thus, there is substantive data behind the argument that far left students might feel 
just as uncomfortable expressing opinions as students on the right. In general, a more in-depth 
focus on these students would have told a different story and produced far different results. 
 
Other Forms of Politics 
While my thesis has focused mainly on political discourse from ideological and partisan 
perspectives, this only captures part of the story on campus discourse. Much of the literature on 
affective polarization speaks in partisan or ideological terms. This makes sense given what 
surveys like ANES aim to accomplish; however, it does not encompass the various issues that 
would register on a college student’s “feeling thermometer.” I found many interview participants 
were hesitant to describe themselves as Democrats or Republicans. They preferred to be referred 
to by their ideology, rather than their partisan identity. It’s possible that this stemmed from 
students simply being more loyal to ideological principles than party. Another explanation would 
suggest that conservative and libertarian students who felt lukewarm (or worse) towards 
President Trump wanted to distance themselves from the Republican Party. Likewise, some 
liberal students might hesitate to admit support for the Democratic Party if they did not condone 
its performance.  
Regardless of what the correct explanation may be, it’s clear that the climate on campus 
hinges on issues more nuanced than left-right politics. For instance, sexual assault and 
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harassment has become a hot-button issue especially in the past decade. On this issue, we see 
division between those who argue for the need to believe victims of such violence and those who 
argue that Title IX regulations neglect due process rights of the accused. Students may align on 
these issues in the same way they do on political issues (with the left more leaning towards the 
former and the right leaning towards the latter), but sexual assault is not necessarily as 
ideological of an issue. A closer look into how colleges address sexual assault lies outside the 
scope of my research, yet further investigation could shed light on how prevalent affective 
polarization is on the matter and how this might impact campus discourse.  
Another issue that may mirror left-right politics but is not exclusively so is climate 
change. Across the nation, students are taking notice of where their universities are investing 
their endowments. In an effort to send a message about combating climate change, many 
students have called for university divestment from the fossil fuel industry. Most notably, 
students from Harvard and Yale staged a protest on the issue during halftime ceremonies at the 
schools’ traditional football rivalry this past November.  The protest delayed the game for 16
almost an hour and garnered national news attention about divestment. Signs on the field and 
around the stadium included messages such as “President Bacow and Salovey: Our Future 
Demands Action Now” and “Harvard & Yale Complicit” (O’Daly 2019).  
Calls for divestment have also been seen at Bucknell. In September, student activist 
groups organized a rally that attracted hundreds from the University and Lewisburg communities 
(Nicolai and Rosenblatt 2019). Among the demands of the main organizers, Green New Deal 
Lewisburg, one was for the University to divest from the fossil fuel industry and another was to 
16 ​I actually witnessed this protest in person, attending The Game while visiting a friend at Yale over Thanksgiving 
Break. 
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transition away from the school’s on-campus co-generation power plant by 2030 (Green New 
Deal Lewisburg 2020). Divestment may appear to be one-sided with respect to the activism 
around them. However, applying the interpretative data from my research, I would expect that a 
plurality of students (at Bucknell and perhaps elsewhere) may either be silently opposed or 
indifferent to this issue.  
 
Faculty and Administration 
Angling my research more towards polarization among students has its limits in 
describing the political climate on a college campus. As I mentioned earlier, many interview 
participants brought up how the faculty and administration impacts student life and political 
rhetoric. Some students mentioned how the faculty and administration leaned further to the left 
than the student body. Others admitted that they self-censored because they feared that their 
professors, not necessarily their peers, would see them differently or even use grades to punish 
them accordingly. One student who was a member of Bucknell Student Government went as far 
as to suggest that the administration injects their own left-leaning politics into issues where it’s 
not necessary. Last November, a number of Bucknell professors spoke out along with student 
activists against Heather Mac Donald’s visit to campus. Some professors were involved in a 
panel discussion at the alternative event provided that night. Overall, it seemed to be common 
knowledge among my interview participants (and probably a broader section of the University 
community) that the majority of Bucknell professors leaned left, and you could count the number 
of vocal, conservative faculty on one hand. Such an ideological imbalance is not specific to 
Bucknell, as Zimmerman (2016) shows how this trend exists across academia. In fact, it’s 
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difficult to say whether this is a growing trend of a phenomenon that has persisted throughout 
academia for decades (Zimmerman 2016; Rothman et al. 2011).  
To provide a full political ethnography of a college campus, it would be worth gathering 
information from a number of faculty perspectives and survey data on relations with faculty (e.g. 
FIRE 2017, 2018). Additionally, future research should delve further into when the notion (or 
stereotype) of academia’s liberal bias first set in and how it has changed. Mirroring my search 
for unique student perspectives could yield a similar variety of opinions among liberal, moderate, 
and conservative professors. Would these professors be frustrated with the idea that certain 
topics are “off limits” or taboo in college classrooms? Would they encourage students from all 
over the ideological spectrum to speak up, even if they are out of line with their personal beliefs? 
I hope faculty would be fed up with the affective polarization they see on their campuses and 
would work to mitigate the political cleavages in our society through their interactions with 
students. Yet, this idealism might be met in practice with professors who show even more 
disdain for outgroup ideology than their twenty-something year-old disciples.  
Moreover, learning administrative perspectives would add important context to these 
issues. It’s a near-impossible task for college administrators to please all sides, especially if there 
is a tangible level of animosity along ideological divides in the student body. Perhaps 
administrators make decisions that appear ideological for the sake of preventing ideological 
conflict. For instance, one could see why an administration would not want a particular guest 
speaker to come to campus if they were certain to ignite controversy. Some propose that 
administrators lean further left than faculty (see Abrams 2018), but more research is needed to 
arrive at a stronger conclusion.  
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***** 
My reactions to the 2016 election and Donald Trump’s presidency inspired me to pursue 
this project. It’s possible our current age of social media and 24-hour news cycles inflated 
perceptions of divisions on campus that had really existed for years, but I still believe 2016 
represented a turning point of sorts in how American youth view and interpret American politics. 
As we approach the presidential election this coming fall, I am most interested to see whether 
affective polarization will remain on the rise in its aftermath. If Trump wins reelection, I am 
confident that our country and our college campuses will continue on a course of more intense 
polarization. At Bucknell, four more years of Trump would charge up liberal students (perhaps 
beyond the vocal minority) and might further amplify the voices of the most passionate students. 
In general, I would expect Trump’s presidency, and more significantly his rhetoric, to foster 
greater levels of affective polarization to the detriment of civility across the United States. 
If the Democrats take the White House in November, I’m more uncertain how it will 
impact political discourse. Are liberals and Democrats more vocal now because they are out of 
power? This might explain behavior at the elite level, but I’m less convinced that a Democrat in 
the Oval Office would fully mend divisions in our society. For one, I would think that a Biden 
presidency would do little to quiet down Sanders supporters who are disillusioned with the 
party’s nomination choice. Most of Bucknell’s vocal minority appear firmly in the Sanders 
camp, so I would not expect their influence to diminish in such a situation. Furthermore, a 
Democrat in the White House would not resolve issues on college campuses. Controversial guest 
speakers will continue to make appearances, and presumably they will continue to be met with a 
mix of interest, indifference, and outrage. Faculty ideology will not change, though some might 
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not feel the same necessity to project their beliefs once Trump is out of office. Finally, the 
makeup of the student body will not shift, so the same students who feel resentment for outgroup 
partisans will continue, as will the frequency of self-censorship. The greatest impact of Trump’s 
ouster would be a return to decency at the top of American leadership; it’s unclear how this 
would or would not transform colleges and universities. The data I’ve examined indicate that 
problems of polarization on campus are not simply a symptom of Trump’s leadership and 
rhetoric. 
 No matter what happens in the 2020 election, I believe an environment in which college 
students feel afraid to express their true opinion or excessive resentment towards outgroup 
members is wholly unproductive for the United States. It seems contrary to the mission of 
American colleges for their students to exhibit this behavior rather than engaging in debate or 
learning how to interact with those with whom one shares intense disagreements. These 
alternatives are not easy, and it’s difficult to isolate our own political attitudes from the broader 
landscape of issues in Washington and on college campuses. Moreover, some students might 
simply not care for politics and the partisan bickering that comes along with it. Yet in a world 
filled with so much hate, college theoretically seems like the perfect place to address these 
conflicts. Affective polarization is not policy, and it’s not a life or death issue. However, I 
believe a more welcoming environment for discussion would be instrumental in helping to unite 
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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE FORM: 
 
Thank you so much for taking the time to speak with me for my research.  As Professor Ellis 
mentioned to you in class, I am writing my thesis on affective polarization and its impact on 
college campuses. For this study, I am attempting to understand how students view members of 
an opposing political party. I will also ask you a few questions about your own political 
preferences. 
 
This interview should take approximately twenty-five minutes.  Your participation in this 
research will be completely confidential.  With your permission, I will record your responses, but 
will transcribe them to a document without any information that could be used to identify you. I 
will then delete the recording.  Your answers will not be linked to your name in any part of the 
project.  
 
If at any point during our conversation you decide you would like to stop participating in this 
study, or not answer a particular question, you may certainly do so without penalty.  
 
If you have any questions about the experiment or your possible participation, you may 
contact me at shr005@bucknell.edu. If you have any questions regarding the rights of human 
participants in research you may contact ​Professor Slater, Chair of the Institutional Review 
Board, at matthew.slater@bucknell.edu or (570) 577 2767​. 
 
If you consent to participate in this study, please print and sign your name below. By signing 








Qualitative research interview script 
 
1. What do you think about the current political climate? 
2. Would you say you tend to lean more liberal or conservative? 
a. Do you support the Democratic or Republican Party? 
3. How would you describe Donald Trump’s presidency so far? 
a. How much do you think political conversations have changed since the 2016 
presidential election?  
4. Do you think Bucknell’s student body leans more liberal, more conservative or 
somewhere in the middle? Why? 
5. What do you think about people who belong to the [opposite party]? 
a. What do you think about that party’s politicians? 
b. What do you think about that party’s voters? 
6. Do you have any friends that you know support the [opposite party]? 
a. If yes: 
i. Do you discuss politics with them? Is it easy to talk about political issues 
with them? 
ii. If you talk about politics with them, do you feel like you can find any 
common ground with them (is it a productive discussion)? 
b. If no: 
i. Would your opinion of a friend change if you knew they supported that 
party? 
7. If you were to talk about politics with a group of students, do you think you expressing a 
strong opinion would deter other students from sharing an opposing viewpoint?  
a. In other words, do you ever stop yourself from expressing your political opinion? 
8. How important is it to listen to an opposing viewpoint on political issues, specifically on 
college campuses? 
a. What would make you more inclined to listen to an opposing viewpoint? 
9. How can we create a more welcoming environment for a range of political perspectives 
on college campuses (both in class and in other settings)? 
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